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THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
THE MONITORING BOARD,
AND TflE DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CAREt

GEORGE
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w.

DENT'
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INTRODUCTION

The theory of corporate governance underwent a revolution in the 1970's.
Theorists finally abandoned the myth that a public corporation 1 is managed
by its board of directors, and constructed a new model under which the
corporation is managed by its executive officers, and the board, dominated
by outside directors, monitors management's performance. 2 This new
"monitoring model" has gained wide acceptance among commentators, 3
and several of its elements have been adopted by many public corporations. 4
E¥en those commentators who do not enthusiastically embrace the entire
monitoring model tend to agree that monitoring management is a significant
board function. 5
t © 1981 by George W. Dent, Jr.

* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. B.A.,
Columbia College, 1969; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1973.
1
This Article will discuss only public corporations. The role of the board of
directors in closely-held corporations poses entirely different questions. For purposes of this Article, "public corporation" means a corporation whose securities are
regularly traded on an exchange or over the counter.
2
See notes 33-58 and accompanying text infra.
3
See sources cited in note 49 infra. Many commentators insist that even more
radical changes, such as federal chartering of corporations-perhaps with public
directors committed to nonshareholder constituencies-or federal minimum standards for state chartering will be necessary. See generally M. GREEN, R. NADER &
J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CoRPORATION (1976) [hereinafter cited as R.
NADER]; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations,
31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1975); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978). Differences of
opinion about corporate governance often reflect radically different views of how
corporations should function and to whom they should be accountable. Many
advocates of more radical changes in corporate governance want to divert corporations from the pursuit of profit maximization to the pursuit of social goals.
4
See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
5
See note 49 and accompanying text infra. The only major criticism of the
monitoring model has been by Solomon, supra note 3. Solomon examines three
cases of boards restructured in the wake of corporate scandals. He finds the
restructuring unsatisfactory because "[n]ew directors have been drawn from the
623
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But expositions of the monitoring model to date have been rudimentary.
Its proponents have not suggested what forces will prompt corporations to
adopt the model and thereby move it from theory to widely accepted reality.
Nor have they described in detail what the board's duties would be under
the model, much less how these duties would be discharged. Until these
problems are satisfactorily resolved, the potential of tlie monitoring model
for improving corporate governance must be considered an open question.
This Article grapples with these problems. In exploring the possible
mechanisms for enforcing adoption of and performance under the monitoring model, the Article concludes that market forces alone will not suffice and
that legislative solutions face insuperable political and theoretical obstacles. 6
Accordingly, special attention is given to the duty of care of directors and
officers as a possible enforcement mechanism. The duty of care has been a
problem child of corporate law. Its command that directors and officers
perform their duties with reasonable prudence appears on its face to provide
a significant constraint on directors and officers, especially in an age when
control has become divorced from ownership in public corporations.7 In
practice, however, the duty of care has proved almost totally ineffectual. 8 A
key question concerning the monitoring model, then, is what will be the
content of the duty of care given the new role of the director that the model
envisions and, more particularly, whether the duty of care can be revived
and used as a tool for enforcing the monitoring model.
It will be seen that justifications for the evisceration of the duty of care are
unpersuasive; accordingly, the way is open to its revitalization. 9 However,
analysis of the possible duties of directors under the monitoring model will
show that in many respects it will be extremely difficult or impossible to
fashion legal rules for the enforcement of these duties. 10 These conclusions

same elite as old directors," id. at 596 (even though he concedes that appointment
of "nonestablishment" directors creates overwhelming problems, id. at 601-02) and
because "new boards have not been notably more aggressive than unreformed
boards," id. at 596. He does not, however, explain how or why the directors should
have been more aggressive. Nor does he explain why the directors were not aggressive, except for his statement that they were drawn from "the same elite as old
directors," a practice which he seems to concede is unavoidable. Nor does he
consider possible approaches to make the restructured board more effective. Some
commentators, though they do not criticize monitoring itself, have criticized the
outsider dominated board, which is fundamental to monitoring. S. VANCE, BoARDS
OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 5 (1964); Schmidt, Does Board
Composition Really.Make a Difference?, 12 CoNF. BD. REc. 38 (Oct. 1975).
6 See notes 66-123 and accompanying text infra.
7 See text following note 223 infra.
s See notes 131-64 and accompanying text infra.
9 See notes 165-207 and accompanying text infra.
10 See Section VI infra.
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suggest that the new model's potential to improve corporate governance may
be more limited than its proponents have hoped. 11

II.

A.

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Failure of the Old Model

The keystone of the traditional model of corporate governance was the
provision once contained in state corporate laws that "[t]he business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by the board of directors. " 12 In
fact, boards of directors do not and have never managed public corporations. That task is performed by the executive officers, particularly the chief
executive officer. 13 These corporate officers may also be members of the
board, but their power to manage derives not from board membership but
from corporate office. 14 Outside directors-directors who hold no office with
the corporation-play little role in its management. 15 With few exceptions,
the board quickly rubberstamps proposals drafted by the true management,
the executive officers. As Myles Mace showed in his classic study, Directors: Myth and Reality, directors occasionally give advice and counsel at the
request of the chief executive officer, provide some limited discipline over
management, and replace the chief executive officer in times of crisis . 16 The

11

See text following note 302 infra.
The Business Corporation Act of 1933, § 33, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.33
(Supp. 1974) (Smith-Hurd). See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-1 (West Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 701 (McKinney
Supp. 1974). These statutes and most others have now been modified to provide that
the corporation shall be managed by or under the supervision of a board of directors.
See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
13
See J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 12 (1945); H. KOONTZ, THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 21 (1967); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 73, 76-77, 80 (1971).
14
This is proved not only by the impotence of directors who hold no corporate
office-the outside directors-but also by the manner in which corporate decisions
are made. Advice is sought and disputes are resolved among the officers before the
board meeting. Proposals are generally approved unanimously by the board after a
little friendly discussion. Boards rarely reject decisions reached by the controlling
corporate officers. See M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 43-71.
15
See H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 21. This is not a new discovery. Over a
century ago one committee concluded that "the very necessities of the case" made
"practice ciphers" of the outside directors. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY 169 (Philadelphia 1874),
quoted in A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 313 (1962).
16
M. MACE, supra note 13, at 13. See also M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATION 140-41 (1976).
12

--------------------··
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board does not even plan the corporation's general strategy, as some have
argued it could or should do . 17
The directors' failure to manage springs not from personal negligence but
from a basic structural defect in the traditional model of corporate governance; that is, the board could not manage the corporation even if it wanted
to do so. First, the chief executive officer dominates the board. Despite the
trend toward more outside directors, 18 boards traditionq.lly have been, and in
many cases still are, composed largely of insiders 19-the chief executive
officer and his subordinates. The subordinates cannot flout the chief's authority when functioning as directors in his presence. 20 Outside directors,
though less subject to the control of the chief executive officer, are still
unlikely to be very independent. Many are either quasi-insiders whose
autonomy is curbed by economic ties to the corporation and its head, 21 or else
17
R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 128-29, 131
(2d ed. 1961); M. MACE, supra note 13, at 43, 68. But see C. BROWN, PUTTING THE
CoRPORATE BoARD TO WoRK 30 (1976) ("the board of directors is the proper body
for the establishment of broad policies and procedures"). Nor do the outside
directors select the chief executive officer, M. MACE, supra note 13, at 65, 70; have
a significant approval role, R. GoRDON, supra at 128-29; or even ask significant
questions, M. MACE, supra note 13, at 52-55, 69.
18
CONFERENCE BOARD, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 84 (1977); HEIDRICK &
STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 6 (1977); KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL,
BoARD OF DIRECTORS: FIFTH ANNUAL STUDY 3, 9 (1978); Small, The Evolving
Role of the Director. in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1356
(1979).
19 See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD UPDATE 3 (1978)
(ratio of outside directors remained virtually unchanged from 1971 to 1978); M.
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 144-45; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 123 (arguing that
recognition of a trend to more outside directors depends on a dubious definition of
"outside director").
20 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 144-45; M. MACE, supra note 13, at 119-20;
E. McSWEENEY, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 105 (1978); Solomon, supra note 3,
at 584. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
926 (5th ed. unabridged 1980); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the
Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1803-04 (1976). Although the chief
executive may not have absolute power over the other officers, any differences in
opinion among them are likely to be hammered out before the board meeting.
Management then presents a united front at the meeting. See M. MACE, supra note
13, at 120.
21 Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 11 (1972); Solomon,
supra note 3, at 590. See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1830. Cf M.
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 146 ("approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of the
outside directors . . . are lawyers or investment bankers [most of whom] are
suppliers of services to the corporation"); KoRNIFERRY INTERNATIONAL, BoARD
OF DIRECTORS ANNUAL STUDY: BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRIALS SUPPLEMENT 4
(1979) (reporting that although the average nominating committee of the companies
studied had one inside and four outside directors, two of the four outsiders were
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friends of the chief executive officer. 22 Moreover, most outside directors are
corporate executives who expect outside directors to play a passive role on
their own boards and who naturally play a passive role when they themselves
are outside directors. 23 Directors who cause trouble may be fired. 24
Outside directors lack not only the independence but also the intimate
knowledge of the corporation, the time, and the information generated by an
independent staff that would be necessary to manage. Most outside directors
have their primary jobs with corporations in industries different from the
corporations on whose boards they sit; indeed, the antitrust laws would
generally prevent the use of outside directors from corporations in the same

"affiliated" so that a majority of the average nominating committee consisted of
insiders and quasi-insiders). Indeed, there is some dispute whether some directors
typically classified as outsiders should be so classified. See H. KooNTZ, supra note
13, at 122; M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 10 n.2. But see Lubin, Outsiders In: Firms
Adding More Independent Directors But Finding Doing So Can Mean Headaches,
Wall St. J., May 26, 1978, at 38, col. 1 (stating that recently fewer outside directors
have been "quasi-insiders"). This has prompted a trend toward using different
terms. The New York Stock Exchange's Audit Committee Policy, for example,
uses the term "independent director," which it defines as a person "free from any
relationship that ... would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment.''
NYSE GuiDE (CCH) ~ 2495H (1977). In 1978, the SEC proposed to characterize
directors as affiliated and unaffiliated but later abandoned the proposal. See SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,645; notes 93-95 and accompanying text infra.
22 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 146; M. MACE, supra note 13, at 95, 97-100,
108; Solomon, supra note 3, at 584-85; Corporate Rights and Responsibilities:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 327-28
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (statement of Roderick M. Hills)
("outsiders . . . are all too often old friends of the chief executive officers who
would rather resign from the board than severely criticize or vote to oust their old
friend"). See J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 28 & Table 4 (1973).
See also Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev' d on other
grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). But cf. Senate Hearings, supra, at 140 (statement of
Richard M. Cyart) ("[r]ecruitment [of new directors] is not a question of the
president getting friends on the board").
23
E. McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 106; Solomon, supra note 3, at 584 n.13.
See M. MACE, supra note 13, at 54, 69-70 (indicating that chief executive officers
consider the role of outside director a minor, passive one). See also note 148 infra.
24
M. MACE, supra note 13, at 80; E. McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 106. See
also HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INc., supra note 18, at 12 (over 36% of industrial
corporations surveyed reported having "fired" directors). Some have referred to
the "mushroom" concept of a good director: "Put him in a damp dark place, feed
him plenty of horse manure, and when his head rises up through the pile to get
attention or ask a question cut it off quickly and decisively." John T. O'Connor, An
Alternative to the Goldberg Prescription, Rema;ks before the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries 4 (March 14, 1973) quoted in C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 6.
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industry. 25 Their contact with the corporation is usually limited to a meeting
of a few hours' duration once a month or less frequently, 26 much too little
time to learn to manage a public corporation. Information presented to the
board is prepared under the chief executive officer's control and usually
arrives too late to be digested by the outsiders •before they must act on it.27
The minimal pay given most directors shows how insignificant their role is in
corporate governance. 28 Thus, outside directors are neither disposed nor
able to play an active role in managing the corporation.
In light of the commentators' recognition that boards cannot manage, it is
not surprising that courts have explicitly held on occasion that the directors
are not liable for failing to do so. 29 More often, though, courts have maintained the fiction that the board must manage, but in various ways have
whittled the duty down almost to nothing. 30 In either case, the board was
left, so far as the courts were concerned, with no significant function. Some
state corporation laws have been amended to reflect the realization that
boards do not manage. The Model Business Corporation Act, for example,
was revised to provide that "the business and affairs of a corporation will be
managed under the direction of a board of directors,'' and many state

Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 141-43 ("few boards spend more than
thirty-six hours a year in meeting time" and "time spent preparing for meeting is
roughly comparable to meeting time"); KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note
18, at 20 (median time spent is a little over 70 hours per year, ''industry time on
committees and expected homework"); M. MACE, supra note 13, at 107, 109, Mace,
Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, 54 HARV. Bus. REv. 20 (Nov.-Dec. 1976).
27 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 143-44. See also M. MACE, supra note 13, at
107 ("And to assume that company presidents [as outside directors]-busy company presidents-will spend the time to do the homework essential to understanding company problems is asking more than should be reasonably expected.").
28 H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 147 (directors "are among the lowest-paid
segments of the American managerial hierarchy"); M. MACE, supra note 13, at
101-04; Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 327-28 (statement of former SEC
Chairman Roderick M. Hills) ("Compensation for directors of too many large
corporations is set at a figure which makes it apparent that no real work is
expected."). However, this may be changing. Heidrick & Struggles' survey shows
that the median compensation for companies surveyed jumped from under $8,000 in
1976 to over $12,000 in 1980. For larger corporations, compensation was considerably higher. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD: 1980 UPDATE (1980).
29 G~aham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 85-86, 188 A.2d 125, 130
(S. Ct. 1963); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted
Reef?, An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware
Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 924-25 & authorities cited at 925 n.23 (1980).
Jo See notes 130-64 and accompanying text infra.
25
26
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statutes followed suit. 31 Although the amendments relieve the board of the
duty to manage, they give no inkling of what the directors are supposed to
do. 32
The New Model: The Board as Monitor of Corporate Officers

B.

The old model of corporate governance having been discredited, commentators began to fashion a new model that concedes to the executive officers
the authority to manage but retains a useful role for the board. Professor
Melvin Eisenberg, the leading advocate of the new model, reviewed proposals intended to enable the board to manage-including ones that called for
fully-staffed boards and boards dominated by professional or full-time
directors-and concluded that none was likely to succeed. 33 He argued that,
rather than make an unrealistic demand that the board manage the corporation, we should try to ascertain what useful functions boards can perform
and then conform the model of corporate governance to that reality. 34
Examining those functions that the board can perform, he found none very
important except the monitoring function. 35 He therefore proposed a new
model of corporate governance that focuses on the board's monitoring function.
31

MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 35 (1976). The Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Laws of the American Bar Association approved the revision on September 21, 1974. Report a/Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501
(1975). For a discussion of identical and comparable state statutes, see MoDEL Bus.
AcT ANN.§ 35, Par. 1, ~~ 3.01-.02 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141 (1980 Supp.); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 701 (McKinney 1963); W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 140.
32
See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1799; Vagts, Directors: Myth and
Reality, 31 Bus. LAw. 1227, 1230 (1976). The comment to the amendment of§ 35
states that directors need not "become involved in the detailed administration of the
corporation's affairs" but "may delegate to appropriate officers of the corporation
the authority to exercise those powers not required by Jaw to be exercised by the
board itself." As to what directors are supposed to do, the comment says only that
"the board has the power to probe to any depth but has a responsibility to do so only
to the extent that the standard of care would require." Report of Committee on
Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAw.
501' 504-05 (1975).
33
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 49-56. See also Eisenberg, Legal Models of
Management Structure in the Modem Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975), one of a series of articles on which the
book just cited is based. The proposals rejected by Professor Eisenberg call for
professional directors, full-time directors, and fully-staffed boards.
34
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 156.
35
Id. at 156-68. The functions Professor Eisenberg deems unimportant are giving
advice and counsel to the chief executive officer, authorizing major corporate
functions, and providing a vehicle for exercising influence or control.
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Discussion of the monitoring model is complicated by the absence of any
detailed definition of what it is or how it would be effectuated. Professor
Eisenberg and others have described the new model in a rudimentary fashion
only. 36 The purpose of this Article is not to define the model precisely but to
inquire whether under any plausible definition the model would be enforceable. It is therefore appropriate simply to describe the areas of agreement
and the undecided issues concerning the model's definition. All agree that
monitoring entails selecting, evaluating, and, if necessary, removing and
replacing directors and corporate executivesY Corollary functions include
fixing management's compensation, reviewing transactions between the
corporation and its insiders, and overseeing management's compliance with
the law. It is an open question whether the board would select corporate
accounting procedures. 38 The commentators have not suggested the methods by which the board should discharge its duties-for example, how the
board could evaluate management's performance or monitor management's
compliance with law, or whether the board should have an independent staff
to provide it with information.
Another open question is whether the board should consider social as well
as financial goals in evaluating management's performance. 39 This Article
will not attempt to resolve the old and continuing debate about for whom
corporate managers are trustees-the shareholders or society at large. 40
More important than the author's agreement with those who would restrict
the board to representing shareholder interests is the fact that adoption of
36
See id. at 162-66. According to Professor Eisenberg, monitoring is intended
"to determine whether the incumbent should remain in place." !d. at 164. Toward
this end the board must set objectives "against which to measure management's
results" and then "[go] behind the result" to determine whether it has been
affected by unanticipated factors. !d. at 166. However, he does not suggest by what
structures or procedures the board will do this, how the board will determine
appropriate objectives, how disputes between the board and management should be
resolved, or answers to many other questions critical to the monitoring model.
Professor Mace does go into somewhat greater detail, but only by way of a list of
board functions without substantial discussion of how these functions are to be
discharged (e.g., by what standards executive compensation is to be set). Mace,
supra note 26, at 21-22. Professors Leech and Mundheim discuss the proper functions of the board in somewhat greater depth, but without suggesting concrete
standards- for performance of these funtions. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20.
Most other advocates (see sources cited in note 49 infra) have been very vague.
Mundheim, A Time to Learn, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND
GoVERNANCE 179, 179-80 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) ("not many . . . have gone
beyond sketching the content of [monitoring] in a few specific situations.").
37
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 162-68; Mace, supra note 26, at 21-22;
Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 3, 27 (Summer 1977).
3 8 See notes 270-78 and accompanying text infra.
39 Professor Eisenberg believes the board should consider social goals. M.
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 165.
40
See notes 295-97 and accompanying text infra.
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the monitoring model itself will not lead to abandonment of a profit ori~nta
tion. 41 Accordingly, this Article will analyze monitoring from the perspective of a traditional profit orientation.
A key question is to what extent, if any, the board would retain authority
to set or to review long range goals and major projects. Professor Eisenberg
believes that the board is incompetent to decide these matters. Moreover,
assigning these duties to the officers would facilitate development of an
effective duty of care. 42 However, whether the courts will permit boards to
abdicate completely their traditional authority over major corporate policy is
questionable. 43 The revision of the Model Act and of many state statutes to
relieve the board of the express duty to manage the corporation's business
does not seem to have been intended to deny the board's authority over long
range goals and major projects. 44
If the board does retain some power over long range goals and major
projects, the difference between the monitoring model and the traditional
model of corporate governance is arguably a difference of emphasis only.
Even if this is true, however, the difference of emphasis is significant. The
traditional model has tended to view the corporate officers as mere
functionaries effectuating the orders of the board. 45 Accordingly, any duty
41

See notes 298-99 and accompanying text infra.
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 140-41. Accord, Conard, A Behavioral
Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895, 917; Solomon,
supra note 3, at 588. But see Goldsshmid, The Governance of the Public Corporation: Internal Relationships, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE STUCTURE AND
GovERNANCE 167, 174 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979).
43
Although the board may delegate many functions, it may not delegate all of its
power, or so much of it as to be inconsistent with its duty to provide general
Supervision of the corporation. 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 496 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
44
The Corporate Director's Guidebook says that the purpose of the revision was
to "emphasize" the duty, inter alia, to "review and confirm basic corporate
objectives.'' Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking &
Business Law, American Bar Ass'n, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus.
LAw. 1595, 1607 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook]. The
comment to section 35 states that the 1974 amendment was intended "to eliminate
any ambiguity as to the director's role in formulating management policy as opposed to direct involvement in day-to-day management.'' Report of Committee on
Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAw.
501, 505 (1975). However, the comment does not indicate precisely what the
board's role is in management policy. See note 32 supra.
45
"Traditionally, officers are selected, and are removable, by the board of
directors, which delegates to them authority to execute and administer the policies
determined by the board of directors." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CoRPORATIONS § 219, at 432 (2d ed. 1970) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, officers
have only such powers as are conferred on them by the board or corporate charter.
2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 434, at 301-03. Thus officers who are not directors
are not deemed trustees, as are directors, but mere agents. 3 id. § 846. See generally
id. § 1032.
42
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to manage carefully rested with the board. Similarly, the board's duty to
monitor the corporate officers was accorded little importance on the theory
that the officers were mere functionaries. The monitoring model reverses
this approach by placing the duty to manage primarily, if not exclusively,
with the corporate officers and by elevating to major significance the board's
duty to monitor.
Although the utility of outside directors has hitherto been limited, 4 6 the
monitoring model may change this. The outside directors are not asked to
manage, a task for which they are ill-suited, but only to monitor management, a task for which an outsider's perspective is well-suited, perhaps even
necessary. Inside directors cannot be expected to evaluate their own performance dispassionately. Moreover, once it is candidly recognized that the
board does riot itself manage but rather monitors management, arguments
for a board dominated by outsiders become much more persuasive. 47 Once
outsiders dominate the board and control nominating procedures, they will
be in a much better position to act independently of management. 4 8
Many commentators have accepted Professor Eisenberg's views or ones
similar to them. 49 More important, many corporations are stressing the
See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
One argument against the outsider-dominated board has been that outsiders
are less competent than insiders to manage the corporation. See Bialkin, Exaggerating the Moral Decline in Governance of Corporations, NAT. L.J., Dec. 25, 1978, at
26, col. 1. This argument is valid, however, only if the board is indeed supposed to
manage. But see note 254 and accompanying text infra.
48 See notes 251-52 and accompanying text infra.
49 C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 10, 109; Conard, supra note 42, at 917 (outside
directors' function is ''to decide whether the inside directors are doing a reasonably
good job"); DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OuTSIDE DIRECTORS (A. Cohen &
R. Loeb eds. 1978) (statement of Ralph C. Ferrara); Friendly, Make Haste Slowly,
in CoMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 525, 527-31 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979); Goldschmid, The Governance of the Public Corporation: Internal Relationships, in id., at 167, 174; Mace, supra note 26, at 21; Manning, supra
note 37; Mundheim, A Time to Learn, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE STRUCTURE AND GovERNANCE 179 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Werner, Management, Stock
Market and Corporate Reform: Berte and Means Reconsidered, 77 CoLUM. L.
REV. 388, 412 (1977). The SEC has in speeches, enforcement actions, and
explanatory releases encouraged changes in corporate governance generally consistent with the monitoring model. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 581 n.4, 582 n.6,
586-87; Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors, 41
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 63, 76-78 (Summer 1977).
Some commentators seek more radical changes in corporate governance, changes
that would direct much of the energies of the corporation away from profit maximization toward social goals. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 610. But the monitoring
model is not inconsistent with these more radical views. Under the model, the
officers attempt to achieve the corporation's goals, whatever they may be, and the
46
47
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director's monitoring function, as evidenced by the growing number of both
outside directors 50 and oversight committees. The oversight committees are
established expressly to perform various monitoring functions. 51 The most
common are audit committees, which review the independent accountant's
reports on auditing and accounting matters ;52 nominating committees, which
review the performance of incumbent directors, suggest the removal of
unsatisfactory directors, and recommend replacements for vacancies; 53 and
compensation committees, which review compensation of executive officers
and may evaluate management's performance as part of this review. 54 Most
of these committees are composed primarily or exclusively of outside directors.55 Acceptance of monitoring by commentators and corporations has led
the Corporate Director's Guidebook and some other authorities to speak of a
duty of monitoring as if it were established fact rather than a remote ideal. 56
Advocates of the monitoring model hope that it will provide some meaningful check on self-serving behavior, incompetence, or complacency on the
part of management, a check not always provided by shareholders or market
forces. The result would be more honest and effective management-and
perhaps greater faith in, and thus more legitimacy for, corporate manboard evaluates management's performance, a task that necessarily entails setting
the corporation's goals.
50 In 1977, 83% of manfacturing companies and 86% of nonmanufacturing
companies were reported to have a majority of outside directors. J. BACON & J.
BROWN, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES IN NINE
COUNTRIES (1977). See also sources cited in note 18 supra.
51
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 216-17, and authorities cited
therein. See generally A.B.A. Comm. on Corp. Laws, The Overview Committees of
the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979). As to the growth of compensation, nominating, and audit committees, see notes 219, 252, & 265 infra.
52
Under pressure from the SEC, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977), the New York Stock Exchange adopted a rule requiring each
listed company to have an audit committee composed entirely of directors independent of management. NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ~ 2495H (1977). An independent director is defined as one "free from any relationship that ... would interfere with the
exercise of independent judgment." !d. See generally notes 265-78 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the audit committee.
53
See note 252 infra. See also notes 251-63 and accompanying text infra for a
general discussion of nominating committees.
54
See note 219 infra. See also notes 217-50 and accompanying text infra for a
general discussion of compensation committees.
55
A recent survey by the SEC shows that the vast majority of overview committees of the companies surveyed had a majority of outsiders and that in many cases
these committees were composed exclusively of outsiders. SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 17,518, SEC Docket 1551, Tables 14-18, at 1571-77 (Feb. 5, 1981).
56
See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 557-62; Corporate Director's
Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1607-10.
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agements. 57 Others have questioned whether the model can improve corporate governance at all. 58

III.

PROSPECTS FOR ADOPTION OF THE MONITORING MODEL
VOLUNTARILY OR AS A RESULT OF MARKET FORCES

Despite auspicious trends, the monitoring model is far from universally
accepted. Most boards remain dominated by insiders or quasi-insiders,s9
and most lack mechanisms to perform certain crucial monitoring functions. 6o
Moreover, monitoring has received little judicial recognition. Unless the law
imposes a duty to monitor, bureaucratic inertia and the human distaste for
being judged will make many managements reluctant to adopt vigorous
monitoring boards.
Outside directors alone cannot be expected to impose a monitoring board
on a corporation. They may justifiably fear that voluntary acceptance of a
duty to monitor will increase their exposure to personal liability, especially
since the traditional posture of director passivity has avoided liability so
well. 61 Active monitoring will require more time from outside directors than
the traditional model requires. 62 Outsiders will not assume additional chores
without additional compensation. Without some strong, external incentive
they may decline to vote themselves adequate raises because the resultant
fees would seem excessive in comparison with fees at corporations where
directors were not required to monitor. Even with increased fees, many
outside directors, being wealthy and busy executives, will hesitate to devote
more time to a position they consider honorary. 63 Moreover, if they agree to
monitor management aggressively they will be hard put to oppose board
monitoring of their own performance in the corporations they manage. Even
if outside directors were disposed to monitor, they are outnumbered by
inside and affiliated directors in many corporations and thus will be unable to
impose their will on the corporation. 64
Management will not voluntarily adopt monitoring. Monitoring by the
57 See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1804. Most commentators have
discussed monitoring in terms of dealing with existing problems rather than in terms
of improving management or enhancing corporate legitimacy, see authorities cited
in note 49 supra, but the two approaches are only different sides of the same coin.
58 De Mott, Reweaving the Corporate Veil: Management and Structure and the
Control of Corporate Information, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 182, 220-21 (Summer 1977); Solomon, supra note 3, at 588-89, 610. See note 3 supra.
59 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
60 See, e.g., notes 219-21 and accompanying text infra.
61 See note 130 and accompanying text infra.
6 Z See H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 151, 232; Goldschmid, supra note 42, at 175;
Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1829.
63 A principal reason for serving as an outside director is the prestige and honor of
the position. M. MACE, supra note 13, at 105-09. Concerning the fee levels of
directors, see note 28 supra.
64 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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board threatens not only criticism of management, perhaps disclosed to the
public, 65 but also the discharge of managers found incompetent. Even
confident managers may prefer not to submit to independent boqrd evaluation unless managers of other corporations do likewise. Since few will want
to be in the vanguard, monitoring will not be widely embraced unless
required by some external forces. Even good faith efforts to install a monitoring system will be more successful if there is a legal duty imposed on
directors to monitor. Finally, the initial burst of enthusiasm for monitoring
cannot be expected to last forever. As the novelty of the new model wears
off, commentators, the bar, and the SEC will tum their attention elsewhere;
boards will feel less public pressure to monitor and will be less inclined to
adopt the new model unless compelled by law to do so.
But it may be argued that enforcement of the monitoring model is unnecessary and even counterproductive because market forces alone will push
corporations to the optimal type and the amount of monitoring. Market
forces are believed to motivate corporate managers to perform well: their
performance affects the market price for the firm's securities, thereby affecting not only their current income (through bonuses, stock options, and the
value of stock already held), but also their job security (by changing the
likelihood of a takeover of the firm by outsiders) 66 and the market for their
services with other corporations. 67 It could be argued that market forces will
similarly affect the composition and functioning of the board. If monitoring
maximizes corporate profits, corporations failing to adopt the model will see
the market price of their stock fall and will be threatened by takeovers in
which all directors will be replaced. In addition to takeover threats, both
outside directors and insiders would have positive incentives to adopt monitoring. If board evaluation of management's performance became significant
to investors, management might insist on such evaluation as a means of
boosting both the firm's stock price and the market for the managers'
services. 68 If monitoring became widely accepted, a market would develop
65

See note 228 infra.
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738, 784-86 (1978); Fama,Agency Problems and the The01y of
the Firm, 77 J. PoL. EcoN. 288passim (1980); Lorie, An Economist's Perception I: A
View on the Need to Revise C01poration Statutes, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE
STRUCTURE AND GoVERNANCE 51,56-59 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Werner, supra note
49, at 404-05 and authorities cited in 404 n.105.
67
See Fama, supra note 66, at 292-93; Werner, supra note 49, at 404. "(I]n some
corporations the excruciating pressure to meet profit goals is so severe that some
managers have committed illegal acts to induce sales, and falsified corporate books to
conceal improper accounting entries designed to improve earnings or put a better
face on corporate performance." Speech by SEC Chairman Harold Williams, Adequate Information: Prerequisite to an Effective Board 16-17 (Sept. 16, 1980) (presented to the Financial Executives Research Foundation/American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Philadelphia, Pa.).
68
See Fama, supra note 66, at 292-93. Cf. Burton, Management Auditing, in
66
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for the services of effective outside directors, and outside directors would
want to monitor effectively so as to increase the value of their services in the
market. 69 If, on the other hand, the monitoring model is not the most
effective way of improving management's performance, market forces will
discover the most efficient way and punish corporations that adopt monitoring instead. 70 If this were the case, legal rules requiring monitoring could be
counterproductive.
The argument for reliance on market forces alone has several flaws. First,
even if market forces do ultimately punish corporations that fail to adopt
monitoring, that punishment, when it occurs, may be visited not on the
managers but on the shareholders. Even an inevitable but distant takeover
may not deter managers from lining their own pockets or keeping themselves
in power too long because the day of reckoning is remote and the benefits in
the interim are so great. 71 The shareholders will suffer, however, from
lowered dividends and a lower price for their stock when the takeover does
come. 72
Furthermore, market forces operating through the outside directors are
not likely to be sufficient. First, in many corporations, genuinely independent directors are too few to be able to impose their will.7 3 Second, a market
for outside directors is unlikely to influence those outside directors who are
highly paid executives of other corporations and who would not want
careers as professional directors, even at fees considerably higher than the
current mode. A sense of responsibility and concern for personal reputation
will motivate outside directors to monitor in many cases, but where they do
not, market forces will not oblige them to do so. Moreover, if the outsiders
control the board, they may be able, subject only to a takeover threat,7 4 to
ignore the market for their services as outside directors and vote themselves
lavish fees without providing efficient monitoring.
MODERN MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND IDEAS 483, 492 (D. Hampton ed. 1969) (creditors, investors, and managers might insist on release of management audits).
69 See Fama, supra note 66, at 294; Lear, Compensation for Outside Directors, 57
Harv. L. REV. 18, 28 (1979) (increasing competition for outside directors has caused
and will continue to cause higher directors' fees).
70 See Fama, supra note 66.
71
See id. at 296; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 273 (1977).
72
In computing the amount per share the tender offeror is willing to pay shareholders of the target,-it must subtract from the total amount the immense transaction
costs of making the bid. It also must reduce the price to account for the risk that his
offer may fail. Most important, the offeror will bid no more than necessary to obtain
control. Since the price of shares in a mismanaged company will almost always be
relatively low, the offeror may be able'to gain control at a price well below what the
shares would command if the company were well managed, especially if no competing bidders appear. Indeed, some believe that offerors do not attempt takeovers
except at bargain prices. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101, 106-09 (1979).
73
See note 19 supra.
74
Just as the threat of a takeover is insufficient to ensure energetic, competent,
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Most important, the market for corporate control is not so efficient that a
takeover will immediately (or perhaps ever) punish even the slightest deviation from maximum efficiency. Even in an ideal takeover situation-minimal
government regulation, a target company with stock widely scattered among
many shareholders, and little stock held by management-the takeover of a
large public company involves substantial transaction costs and risks of
failure. 75 Moreover, the ideal is rare. Some corporations are so huge that any
attempt to take them over is unthinkable. Others, their managements wary
of takeovers, have a variety of shark-repellents to deter tender offers. 76
Indeed, a servile board is an important element in any anti-takeover strategy.
A servile board will approve any action by management, however outrageous, to keep itself entrenched. 77 The independent board envisioned by the
monitoring model might take a neutral or even a favorable stance toward a
takeover. 78 State and federal regulation of tender offers has also made them
more difficult. At a minimum, disclosure requirements, such as those imposed by the SEC under the Federal Williams Act, make tender offers very
expensive. 79 Many states' tender offer laws were adopted with the thinly
and efficient management, see note 71 supra and 75 infra, that threat will also be
insufficient to ensure energetic and competent outside directors.
75 See 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CoNTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 99-100
(1970); Winter, supra note 71, at 267-70.
76 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 263-89 (1978)
and Supp, 1980 at 134-41, detailing the many measures taken by corporate managements to discourage takeovers. See also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note
20, at 1594-95.
77 See Wyser-Pratte, Takeover Panel Needed To Protect Shareholders, N.Y.L.J.,
June 4, 1979, at 25, col. 5 (describing incidents in which the author believes that
corporate managements have opposed tender offers that were clearly attractive to
shareholders). See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 76, at vii:
Modern corporate takeover battles resemble closely the feudal wars of the
middle ages .... The Board of Directors is the Council. Like the feudal Council,
it is often subservient to the Count [the president] .... Without the full support
of the Council, takeover defense is almost impossible, and the Castle will be
quickly lost.
78
Even advocates of broad board discretion to oppose tender offers concede that
shareholders will usually accept any tender offer at a substantial premium over the
pre-offer price of the target company's shares. Lipton, supra note 72, at 113-14. A
board more attuned to the wishes of the shareholders rather than management
therefore might well be more receptive, or at least less hostile, to takeover bids. At the
least, nonaffiliated outside directors do not face the same conflicts of interest as do
inside and affiliated directors when weighing an unsolicited tender offer. See Williams, Tender Offers and the Corporate Director, (speech before the 7th Annual
Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California, Jan. 17, 1980), reprinted in
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder) FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,445 (1980). Thus,
strengthening the independent directors would enhance the possibility of fair treatment of shareholders.
79
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See
Winter, supra note 71, at 268-69. See also Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of
Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 371 (1980)

638

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 623

veiled purpose of preventing all hostile takeovers. 80 Takeover by proxy fight
is also expensive and the advantages of incumbency are so great that proxy
fights are rarely attempted except in extreme cases. 81 Thus, market forces
cannot be relied upon as the sole tool for encouraging the adoption of
efficient monitoring.
Even if market forces induced most corporations to adopt monitoring,
those corporations which are not subject to market forces would not be apt
to adopt monitoring. Accordingly, some other mechanism will be necessary
to require adoption of the monitoring model if it is to be fully accepted and
reach its full potential.
IV.

POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR REQUIRING ADOPTION OF THE
MoNITORING MoDEL

Three mechanisms for promoting the monitoring model deserve exploration: use of existing federal legislation, enactment of new state or federal
legislation, and use of the duty of care, sometimes common law and sometimes statutory, that directors and officers owe to the corporation they
serve.
A.

Existing Federal Legislation

No existing federal legislation is adequate to enforce the monitoring
model. Prior to 1977, the "new fraud" doctrine developed under the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule 10b-5 82 appeared to be a federal basis
for attacking mismanagement of public corporations. Even at its apex,
however, the doctrine was flawed for this purpose because it was limited to
fraud' 'in connection _with the purchase or sale of [a] security' ' 83 and because
it covered only breaches of the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care. For
example, although mismanagement in the purchase of property with stock
would have been actionable, mismanagement in the purchase of property for
cash could not have been attacked under the new fraud doctrine. 84 In any
event, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1977 case of Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
(concluding that state and federal regulations, although they increased the premiums paid by btdders, have discouraged many takeover attempts, and that their
effect on shareholders is generally detrimental).
80
See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 1603; Sommer, The Ohio
Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 681, 682 (1970).
81 Williams, Cumulative Voting, 33 HARV. Bus. REv. 108 (May-June 1955).
8z 17 C.P.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
83 Id. Although this language of the rule was often expansively construed, see
Superintendent oflns. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, CASES & MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 994-97 (4th ed. 1977),
"many corporate mismanagement charges do not ... involve any purchase or sale of
securities." /d., at 994.
84 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); D. RATNER,
SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 140-41 (1978).

1981]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

639

v. Green 85 that a 10b-5 suit requires an allegation of deception or manipulation. 86 Although the lower federal courts have disagreed on the precise
meaning of this holding, 87 it does establish that mismanagement alone is not
actionable under rule lOb-5. Thus, rule lOb-5 certainly cannot be used to
obligate a corporation to adopt a monitoring model for its board of directors.
The SEC proxy rules adopted pursuant to section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act 88 have been touted as a possible tool for encouraging monitoring by directors. It is contended that shareholders' influence over board
conduct will be enhanced if they are provided more information about the
directors' activities. 89 Consequently, directors who do not actively monitor
can be removed and replaced by those who will. But it is well established that
most shareholders do not want to participate actively in corporate controJ.9°
Moreover, even if they did, the lack of any alternative to management's slate
of board nominees (except in the rare case of a proxy fight) renders their
vote meaningless. Indeed, many commentators have concluded that even
the existing· level of corporate proxy disclosure cannot be justified on a
cost-benefit basis. 91 If increased disclosure of board practices will in fact
affect those practices, the cause is likely to be potential embarrassment at
the disclosures, not shareholder votes. However, many have questioned the
propriety of using disclosure requirements in this way. 92
A few years ago the SEC threatened to take disclosure of board practices
to new lengths by establishing guidelines for director functions and requiring
corporations to disclose the extent to which their board practices departed
from these guidelines. 93 The Commission eventually abandoned the effort
430 u.s. 462 (1977).
ld. at 473-74.
87
See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell ex
rei. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
88
SEC rules 14a-1 to 12, 17 C.P.R. § 240.14ac1 to 12 (1980).
89
Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 49. But see New Approaches to Disclosure in
Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 530-31 (ABA Panel Discussion)
(remarks of Harold Marse, Jr.) (it is unrealistic to expect management to evaluate
itself candidly).
9
° C. BROWN, supra note.17, at 25; Manning, supra note 37, at 14-19.
91
E.g., Benston,An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required
Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. FRoB. 30 (Summer
1977); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 132 (1973). See also Stigler,
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964) (concerning 1933
Act disclosure). The criticisms apply equally to proxy disclosures.
92
E.g., H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PuRPOSE 190-91 (1979).- Others have defended the practice. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC 414
(Nov. 3, 1977); Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 60.
93
SEC Excha~ge Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,645 at 80,580. See Address by SEC Chairman G.
8S
86
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because of the difficulty of drafting the guidelines and complaints that the
prqposals exceeded the SEC's authority. 94 Perhaps this semi-coercive disclosure approach could have effectively compelled corporations to follow
the monitoring model. The rules actually adopted by the Commission are
limited, however, to added disclosures about the directors' activities, 95 and it
seems unlikely that this will shame many corporations into altering their
board practices significantly. Shareholders' voting certainly will not be so
altered by the new disclosures as to require corporations to amend their
practices.
More recently, the SEC has demanded revision of a corporation's governance structure as part of consent decrees in enforcement actions where it
believes that a restructured board might help prevent future securities law
violations. 96 The revisions demanded contain many elements of monitoring,
including the establishment of a board with a majority of outside directors, of
an audit committee, and of formal mechanisms to monitor management's.
compliance with law. 97 Demands by the Commission for such ancillary relief
raise a number ofproblems, 98 but for present purposes it suffices to note that
ancillary relief is of limited duration and can be obtained only in cases in
which the SEC alleges that a corporation has violated the federal securities
laws. 99 Even if ancillary relief is beneficial, it cannot be a tool for the general
reform of corporate governance.
Bradford Cook, Southern Methodist University School of Business Administration
(April 6, 1973), reprinted in [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~
79,302.
94
·
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 81,766. See What the SEC Expects of Corporate
Directors, address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. before Arthur D. Little Corporate Directors Conference, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 1974).
95 Item 6 to schedule 14A, 17 C.P.R. § 240.14a-IOI, as amended by Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 11 81,766.
96
E.g., SEC v. Matte!, Iric., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6467, 6531, & 6532
(D.D.C. 1974). See Farrand, Ancillwy Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Actions,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1779 (1976); Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches of Rule JOb-5, 53 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 397 (1979); Note,
Ancillary Relief in SEC injunction Suits for Violation of Rule JOb-5, 79 HARV. L.
REV: 656 (1966); Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal
Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737 (1976).
97 Second Amended Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction and Ancillary
Relief, SEC v. Matte!, Inc., Civ. No. 7H-2958-W (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1974),
reprinted in DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 167 (A. Cohen &
R. Loeb eds. 1977). See Jacobs, supra note 96, at 442-45; Comment, supra note 96, at
738-40.
9B See generally Comment, supra note 96.
99 In general, the SEC may seek judicial relief only for violations of the securities
laws and rules. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Supp. IV 1980);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. IV 1980).
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Many other weapons in the SEC arsenal might be used to influence
corporate governance-the internal accounting provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 100 the power to impose rules on stock exchanges and
the NASD, ~ 01 the power to discipline professionals, 102 and the power to
publish findings after investigations. 103 However, these powers, even taken
together and even if one accepts the SEC's broad construction of its powers, are inadequate to change corporate governance in any comprehensive
way. More important, Congress did not intend to confer on the SEC any
general powers regarding corporate governance but to leave that power
where it had always been-with the states. 104
New State or Federal Legislation

B.

Since existing federal legislation is inadequate to require directors to
monitor, perhaps an enforcement tool should be sought in new federal or
state legislation. A legislative solution has much to recommend it. Legislation could deal comprehensively with the corporate governance problem,
prescribing the structure and duties of the board and its committees, the
sanctions for failing to comply with the statute, and the means for enforcing
the statute. More general virtues also inhere in legislation, such as its textual firmness and the legislature's capacity to investigate a problem
thoroughly . 1 05 Moreover, a federal legislative solution would prescribe uniform national standards. 106 This would be desirable because most large

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. IV 1980).
Id., § 19(b) & (c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. iv 1980). The Commission used this
power in effect to force the New York Stock Exchange to adopt its rule requiring
each listed company to have an audit committee. See note 52 supra; Coffee, Beyond
the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1274 (1977).
102
SEC rule 2(e), 17 C.P.R.§ 201.2(e) (1980). The SEC's use of rule 2(e) has been
seriously criticized. H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 198-205.
103
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. ~ 78u (Supp. IV 1980).
Former Commissioner Roberta Karmel has dissented from the use of section 21(a) as
punishment absent a charge of violation of law. Spartek, Inc., SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
~ 81,961, at 81,408-11.
104
H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 173-74 & 174 n.2. Even Professor Cary, a leading
advocate of greater federal involvement in corporate governance, has criticized
efforts to "jigsaw" corporate governance problems into existing legislation. Cary,
supra note 3, at 702.
105
See H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD CASES AND
TExT MATERIALs 12 (1980); H. READ, J. MAcDoNALD, J. FoRDHAM & W. PIERCE,
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 318-21 (1973).
106
It is reasonable to assume that, in the unlikely event that such legislation was
enacted, it would apply only to corporations of a certain size, as do, for example, the
100
101
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public corporations do not confine their activities primarily to one state but
are truly national enterprises whose activities are more logically regulated by
the federal government. Also, federal legislation would mitigate or avoid the
so-called "race to the bottom" in which, according to some critics, states
competing for chartering fees make their corporation laws attra,_ctive to
managements by "watering shareholder rights down to the thin gruel." 101
Although a legislative solution has certain advantages, it also has two
major flaws. First is the political improbability of its adoption. Commentators have been arguing for nearly one hundred years for federal chartering
of public corporations, 108 but the idea does not seem to have gained much
momentum in all that time. Congress certainly is not eager to adopt such
legislation now, and political trends are not favorable for its prospects in the
near future. Professor Cary first proposed federal minimum standards for
state chartering largely because federal chartering was politically implausible;109 however, his own proposal has not gained any greater political
support. Moreover, even those bills recently introduced in Congress concerning corporate governance would not impose the monitoring model on
corporations. 110
The prospects for new legislation are even dimmer at the state level. For
over a century the trend in state corporation laws has been to reduce
regulations and requirements to a bare minimum. Several factors have
contributed to this trend. The most notorious has already been mentionedthe "race to the bottom," the alleged attempt by many states to reduce
regulations in order to attract corporations to incorporate there and thus to
reap a harvest of franchise fees. 111 Many have denied that this trend is
harmful. 112 This race produced a feeling that new state regulation would be
useless, even counterproductive, because corporations would respond simply by leaving the state and incorporating elsewhere. 113 Many have also felt,
proxy and various reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78l-78n & 78p (Supp. II 1980).
107
Cary, supra note 3, at 666.
108
See R. NADER, supra note 3, at 65-71; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 125-28 (1972).
9
I0
Cary, supra note 3, at 700-0 I.
110
The most prominent such bill is Senator Metzenbaum's proposed Protection of
Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The sectionby-section analysis of the bill states that "[t]he duty of care provision[] ... directs
that the director act carefully in fulfilling the important tasks of monitoring and
directing the activities of corporate management." [1980] SEc. REo. & L. REP.
(BNA) F-3 (Apr. 23, 1980). The body of the bill does not bear this out. Section 4(b)
states the duty of care in terms virtually identical to the Model Business Corporation
Act's § 35. See text accompanying note 126 infra (quoting from the Model Act).
111
The phrase was created by Professor Cary. Cary, supra note 3, at 666. The
phenomenon has been noted by many authors. See note 152 infra.
112
See sources cited in notes 114 & 154 infra.
11
3 In 1969, the New Jersey Corporation Law Reform Commission stated: "It is
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perhaps with considerable justification, that enactment of the federal securities laws reduced, if not eliminated, the need for state regulation of public
corporations; that further regulation, if necessary, ought to be undertaken by
the federal government; and finally, that minimum regulation and maximum
flexibility are advisable as a matter of public policy . 114
At neither the state nor federal level is there any m;ganized constituency
pressing for reform of corporate governance. Although investors are not
indifferent about or unaffected by corporate governance, most lack large
enough interests to undertake political action and are not sophisticated
enough to be aware of recent developments in the theory of corporate
governance. Investors prefer to display dissatisfaction with corporate management by selling their stock. 115 The best organized and most effective
lobbyists on corporate governance are corporate executives; they will oppose any effort to mandate monitoring. 116
Even if new legislation were politically feasible, an attempt to codify the
monitoring model would face immense drafting problems. The monitoring
model has not yet been sufficiently articulated to permit it to be prescribed
by detailed legislation. II7 For example, though evaluation of management's
performance is the keystone of the monitoring model, there are currently no
concrete standards for such evaluations that could be incorporated into a
statute mandating monitoring.ll8 Detailed legislation would quickly become
outdated and unduly restrictive as theory and experience evolved, and
would not allow for the fact that the situation of each corporation is different.
Alternatively, Congress or a state legislature might empower an administrative agency to prescribe the duties of corporate boards. 119 On the federal
level, the SEC might be authorized to define directors' duties, but this is
clear that the major protections to investors ... have come, and must continue to
come, from Federal legislation . . . . Any attempt to provide such regulations . . .
through state incorporation acts ... would only drive corporations out of the state to
more hospitable jurisdictions."' REPORT OF THE CORPORATION LAW REVISION
CoMMISSION, in N.J. STAT ANN. tit. 14A, at xi (West 1969) and Cary, supra note 3,
at 666. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations. and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 433, 478-79 (1968).
114
See Garrett, The Limited Role of Corporation Statutes, in CoMMENTARIES ON
CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 95, 96-98 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) (Delaware is preferred not for nefarious reasons but because of desirable flexibility and
certainty); Manning, supra note 37, at 17 (liberal state corporation laws ha~e not led
to "corporate misfortune"); Winter, supra note 71, at 259 (liberal state corporation
laws benefit shareholders by reducing transaction costs).
11· C
, · BROWN, supra note 17, at 25; J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN SHAREHOLDER 60-61 (1958); Manning, supra note 37, at 14-19.
116 s
A
ee nderson, supra note 66, at 782 & n.l30 and authorities cited therein.
17
~ See Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 218-25 (statement of Professor Mundhe1m); notes 36-44 and accompanying text supra.
118
See notes 233-45 and accompanying text infra.
.
119
This position is advocated by C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 144 (1975).

644

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 623

even less politically feasible than a federal statute that excluded the SEC
from such power. The business and financial communities are alarmed at the
Commission's recent attempts to become involved in corporate governance
and other areas which have traditionally been thought to be outside its
jurisdiction. 120 Any attempt to give it a blank check to define the director's
duties would almost certainly meet fierce opposition, opposition which
would, in light of the Commission's past performance, be entirely warranted.I21 Quite apart from the Commission's shortcomings, theoretical
objections exist to delegating the power to define directors' duties to an
administrative agency .122 The current wave of deregulation reflects some of
these objections.
Because of the problems with drafting legislation to define directors'
duties in detail or with delegating this power to an administrative agency, the
best route to legislative enforcement of the monitoring model would probably be to enact a very general statute essentially commanding boards to
monitor effectively. The courts would then give precise content to the
statute. Although legislation could, consistent with this approach, provide a
few additional useful weapons for requiring the use of the monitoring
model, 123 such legislation is largely unnecessary-the director's duty of
care, part of the statutory or common law of every state, 124 already gives
courts authority that can be turned to the same purpose. Legislation that
federalized the duty of care would also provide the procedural advantages of
federal courts to plaintiffs and promote uniform national standards of care.
There remains, however, the question that already exists under the state
law-whether the duty of care can be made an effective weapon for enforcing the monitoring model.

v.

THE DUTY OF CARE

Corporate directors and officers have long been held to owe the corporation a duty of care. 125 When stated in the abstract, the duty of care seems to
12
° For example, the SEC's proposal to define directors' duties provoked massive
criticism. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,901 (Aug. 29, 1977), [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,296, at 81,087-89,81,094. Other SEC
proposals relating to corporate governance have provoked similar criticism.
Grienenberger & McGrath, Reduction in Credibility Stems from Commission Stand
on Accountability, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 29, col. 1. The authors conclude that
the result of the SEC's forays into corporate governance "has been confusion in the
private sector and a reduction in the Commission's credibility." Id. See also H.
KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 28, 31 (1979).
121 See generally H. KRIPKE, supra note 92.
122
Indeed, in 1977 the SEC tried to define directors' duties and abandoned the
task as impossible. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
123
See A. CONARD, supra note 49, at 913-15.
124 See notes 126-27 and accompanying text infra.
125
For some older cases see Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Hun v.
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impose a meaningful obligation on directors and officers. In practice, however, the duty has had almost no effect on corporate governance for several
reasons, not the least of which is confusion over the proper functions of
directors. The evolution of the monitoring model gives a clearer picture of
what the board can and should do and thereby makes it possible to
breathe some life into the duty of care.
A. The Duty of Care: The Ideal and the Reality
In every state directors and officers are held to owe their corporation a
duty of care. Many states have embodied this duty in a statute such as
section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, which provides, in
relevant part, that

[a] director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in
good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would use under similar circumstances. 126
The common law or statutory formulation of the duty of care in most states
is to the same effect. 12 7
So stated, the duty of care seems fairly straightforward and rigorous. The
term "ordinarily prudent person" is a classic negligence standard found in
many other areas of the law, especially torts. 128 The phrase ''in good faith, in
a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation," if not completely redundant with the "ordinarily prudent person"
test, underscores the requirement that the director must act not only with
ordinary diligence and in good faith but also reasonably. Determination of the
standard's exact meaning must generally be handled on a case-by-case basis;
however, this is also true in many other areas of the law and does not
diminish the rule's clarity.
Given the long-recognized failure of directors to do much of anything in
the governance of corporations, 129 one might imagine myriad decisions
Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880); Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atkyns 400,26 Eng. Rep. 642
(Exch. Ch. 1742). See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, §.§ 1029-1064;
H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234; Dysori, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40
IND. L.J. 342 (1965).
126
MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 35 (1976). As to the officer's duty of care, see note
200 and accompanying text infra.
127
Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 505-(1975); MoDEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN.§ 35,
Par. 2, ~~ 3-4 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.). See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (1961); Selheimer v.
Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966); Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686,
405 S.W.2d 577 (1964).
128
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 32, at 150 (4th ed.
1971).
129
See notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra. Problems with the diligence of
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holding directors liable for breach of the duty of care. But the duty of care
long b.een moribun~. As Professor .Bishop expressed .it, cases holding
drrectors liable for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealmg constitute "a
very small number of needles in a very large haystaij;k. '' 130

h~s

B. Reasons for Inefficacy of the Duty of Care
There are numerous reasons for the inefficacy of the duty of care. Several
courts have expressly rejected the ordinarily prudent man standard in favor
of a more lenient test, and others have suggested a more lenient standard in
dicta. 131 Some commentators have argued that court references to bad faith
gross negligence, and recklessness are not intended to reject the pruden~
man standard and that an examination of case holdings, rather than dicta
bears this out. 132 Perhaps so, but practicing lawyers and commentators giv~
credence to dicta; judicial statements appearing to adopt lenient standards of
care no doubt discourage the bringing of suits and influence the bases on
which suits are settled even iflawyers have misinterpreted those statements.
Moreover, courts adheringto the prudent man standard have nevertheless
mitigated the rigor through the so-called business judgment rule, a doctrine
of obscure origin and uncertain meaning. It is well established that directors
are not insurers or guarantors of the corporation's success; 133 indeed, no one
has ever argued the contrary. Directors owe their corporation duties of
loyalty and care and if these duties are observed they will not be held liable
to shareholders or creditors, even if the corporation is not as successful as
the latter hoped. 134 Apparently trying to say no more than this, some courts
directors were noted as long ago as 1776, when Adam Smith wrote:
The directors of Ooint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in
private copartnery frequently watch over their own .... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.
A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Modern Library ed. 1937). (1st ed.
London 1776).
130 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). See also C.
STONE, supra note 119, at 147 ("directors' liability for ordinary negligence is a dead
letter, and even worse").
131 See 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1029, at 12; N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF
CoRPORATIONS § 78, at 274 & nn.12 & 13 (2d ed. 1971).
132 Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1979).
133 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940); H. HENN, supra note 45,
§ 234, at 454; Comment, Factors That Limit the Negligence Liability of a Corporate
Executive or Director, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 341, 345, and cases cited at 345 n.38.
134 See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(applying Michigan law); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721,
723-24 (1912); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1039, at 38; H. HENN, supra note
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in the last century stated that a director is not liable for mere errors of
judgment. 135 The "business judgment" rule is incontestable if it is recognized that to invoke the rule the director must exercise his judgment within
the scope of the duty of care-that is, his judgment must have been
reasonable and exercised with the care of an ordinarily prudent person.
However, courts have often described the business judgment rule without
any reference to the duty of care and, more important, have often dismissed
suits against directors on the ground of the business judgment rule without
first inquiring whether the directors had acted reasonably and with due
diligence. 136 In some cases, courts have simply ignored a statutory "prudent
man" standard in favor of a fraud or bad faith standard under the business
judgment rule. 137 Moreover, courts have frequently extended the rule -beyond its original purpose; for example, it has been used to prevent shareholder interference with directors' decisions even though the shareholder
did not seek to hold the directors liable for their actions . 138
45, § 242; N. LATTIN, supra note 131, § 78, at 272-74; Note, The Continuing Viability
of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 562, 562-63 (1967); Comment, The Business Judgment Rule: A Guide to Corporate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 151 (1962).
135 Many of the early cases clearly demanded ordinary or reasonable prudence by
the director as a condition to his being held not liable. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8
Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829) (denying liability "if the error was one into which a
prudent man might have fallen"); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 70-71 (1880) ("if they act
... using proper prudence and diligence, they are not responsible for mere mistakes
oreuors ofjudgment"); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., I R.I. 312,348 (1850)
("The law requires of them care and discretion, such as a man of ordinary prudence
exercises in his own affairs; and if they practice this, and nevertheless make a
mistake, the law does not hold them answerable."). See generally Arsht, supra note
132, at 97-100.
136 If the business judgment rule requires directors to act with ordinary or reasonable prudence, a complaint alleging negligence could not ordinarily be dismissed
without a trial on the issue of fact of negligence. Nonetheless, many shareholder
derivative suits have been dismissed on summary judgment on the basis of the
business judgment rule. See, e.g., Ash v. International Business Machs., Inc., 353
F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co.,
309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1963); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N .Y.2d 619, 393 N .E.2d 994, 419 N .Y .S.2d 920 (1979); Park off v. General Tel. &
Elec. Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (N.Y. App.
Div. Mar. 11, 1980); Bennett v. Instrument Sys. Corp., 66 A.D.2d 708, 411 N .Y.S.2d
287 (1978).
137
E.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd on opinion below, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976) (suit
dismissed on grounds of business judgment rule without any mention of N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAw§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1980), which requires directors to act "with that
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances.").
138
.
The most significant example is the judicial extension of the business judgment
rule to the decision by a board or board committee to terminate a shareholder's
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At times, judges justify abstention on the ground that the corporation is to
be managed by the board, not the shareholders. 139 But many courts refuse to
recognize that if the duties of care and loyalty mean anything, they must
mean that courts will intervene at a shareholder's request if the board has
not acted with due care or loyalty. Courts sometimes dc;ny that they are
competent to review business decisions. 140 Although courts possess no
special expertise in business affairs, they also have no special expertise in
medical malpractice or many other areas in which they often decide whether
a defendant has acted with reasonable prudence or skill. Nor have they any
special expertise to decide the complicated environmental and patent cases
which they routinely face. Courts are not asked to make business policy or
to decide whether the directors' decisions were the wisest that could have
been made, but only to decide whether the directors acted with reasonable
prudence. This question is no more difficult than many others routinely
decided.
The business judgment rule's precise impact on the duty of care is
impossible to determine. Where the rule is held to obviate ajudicial decision
whether the directors acted with reasonable prudence, whether they did so
is usually unknown. Many cases would probably have been decided
differently, however, if the duty of reasonable prudence had not been modified by the business judgment rule. Moreover, as with dicta suggesting a
lenient standard of care, 141 even if the business judgment rule has been
misinterpreted, that misinterpretation is nonetheless a fact that affects litiga- /
tion and director conduct.
Also weakening the duty of care is the doctrine of reliance on corporate
counsel, accountants, and officers. Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides that "a director shall be entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other
financial data" presented by officers, counsel, public accountants, a committee of the board, or other persons whom the director reasonably believes to
be reliable and competent unless ''he has knowledge concerning the matter
in question that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted.'' 142 Statutory
derivative suit. This application of the rule is in addition to its application to determine whether any director is liable. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Lewis
v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251
(Del. Ch. 1980). See generally Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980).
m See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263
(1917); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759,
762 (3d Cir. 1974 ).
140
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926 (1979).
141
See text following note 132 supra.
14 2 MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT. § 35 (1976).

I
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or common law is to the same effect in most states . 143 Courts have faced
considerable difficulty in defining the scope of the director's right to rely . 144
At one extreme, it might be argued that the directors may rely on the
opinions of corporate officers in deciding how to vote on any matter placed
before the board. This interpretation would, of course, be absurd-it would
allow the director to delegate all his duties to others, leaving him no real
function at all. But a limiting principle is hard to find. Because most concede,
implicitly or explicitly, that the board cannot manage the corporation, one
can hardly deny directors the right to rely on the officers in approving major
managerial decisions. Thus, recognizing that the directors' only significant
duty is to man~ge, 14 5 _it has been difficult to deny directors a right to rely.
Some courts and commentators also fear that a duty of reasonable prudence would pose such a substantial threat of personal liability that the best
qualified persons would decline to serve as directors. 146 Under the old model
of corporate governance this fear may have had some validity. Since outside
directors cannot manage a corporation, holding them liable for failing to
manage would deter many from serving as outside directors. If directors
were assigned tasks they reasonably could perform, however, requiring
them to perform these duties with reasonable care would not deter qualified
persons from serving. 147 A more rigorous duty of care would discourage
143
E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 7I7 (McKinney Supp. I980). See generally
/Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and
Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. I (1976).
144
Hawes & Sherrard, supra note I43, at 4.
145
For example, in addition to providing that, with certain exceptions, "[t]he
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors," DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § I41(a) (1980 Supp.),
Delaware General Corporation Law provides that the board may change the location of the corporation's registered office, id. § 133; issue shares authorized by
the certificate, id. § 16I; declare dividends, id. § I70(a); call special meetings of
stockholders, id. § 21 I (d); fix the record date for meetings of stockholders, id.
§ 213(a); and fill vacant and newly created directorships, id. § 223(a). Also, both the
shareholders and the board must approve amendments to the certificate of incorporation, id. § 242(c)(l); mergers, consolidations, and sales of all or substantially all
assets, id. §§ 25I(b) & 27I(a); and dissolution of the corporation, id. § 275(a).
However, even in the absence of such express statutes most, if not all, of these
powers would probably be deemed implicit in the board's general power to manage
the corporation. Thus, it is fair to say that the board has few statutory functions other
than to manage or direct the management of the corporation.
146
Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 300 A.2d 398, 40I (1964); E.
McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 106; Symposium, The Greening of the Board Room:
Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, IO CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. I5, 23-24
0973) (statement of Professor Harvey J. Goldschmid); Soderquist, Toward a More
Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 134I, 1349-50 (1977); Comment, supra note 133, at 343.
147
Indeed, the many directors who resign in disgust because they serve no
significant corporate role, S. VANCE, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 106 (1978), would
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those who relish the current state of affairs in which' 'no effort of any kind is
required" and in which possession of several directorships is '.'like having a
permanent warm bath.'' 148 But riddance of such directors should be viewed
as desirable. If a director cannot be required to perform some valuable
function with reasonable prudence, the corporation would be better off
saving his fees and avoiding the illusion that he was protecting the shareholders' interests.
Some have also feared that the prospect of crushing personal liability for
simple negligence would force directors to become unduly cautious in
order to avoid risky ventures that might result in losses to the corporation. 14 9
This fear flows from the erroneous assumption that boards actually manage
corporations. As previously noted, boards do not manage and have little
influence regarding even major corporate plans; 150 thus, they do not determine the riskiness of corporate ventures. Rather, the executive officers
manage the corporation, and recent studies suggest that financial markets
give management ample, even excessive, incentives to undertake risks to
maximize corporate profits. 151
A possible further reason is that a lenient standard of care is part of the
race to the bottom among the states, an invitation from each state to
reincorporate there. 152 If this theory were valid, it would be a serious
obstacle to a revival of the duty of care. However, the theory is largely
prefer being given meaningful functions. It might be· necessary, however, to limit
liability for negligence and to increase directors' compensation.
148 TIME, Oct. 5, 1962, at 96, quoted in H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234, at 454 n.3:
/
In Britain, where a company's list of directors often reads like a tear sheet from
Burke's Peerage, many a titled tycoon sits on more boards than he can count.
Lord Boothby, 62, a longtime Tory backbencher who is one of this happy breed
himself (he has 'eight or nine' directorships), explained last week just what
directors do in return for adding prestige to corporate letterheads. "No effort of
any kind is called for," he told an audience of Yorkshire clubwomen. "You go to
meeting once a month in a car supplied by the company. You look both grave
and sage, and on two occasions say 'I agree,' say 'I don't think so' once, and
if all goes well, you get $1,440 a year. If you have five of them, it is total heaven
like having a permanent hot bath."
149 See Veasey & Manning, supra note 29, at 931-32 (stressing desirability of
encouraging risk taking); Comment, supra note 133,_ at 343.
150 See notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra. However, setting ·goals will
necessarily involve the board in management. See text accompanying notes 234-37
infra.
151
See notes 66-67 supra.
152
See Cary, supra note 3, at 665-66, 670, 683-84. See also Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The race was not one of diligence
but of laxity."); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the
Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991,992-93 (1976); Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism,
and the Federal Courts, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 146, 151 (Summer 1977). Other
commentators have questioned whether the race to the bottom is undesirable,
Winter, supra note 71, at 289-92, and even whether such a race exists at all, Manning,
supra note 37, at 17-18.
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meritless. Even in Delaware, supposedly the leading instigator of the race to
the bottom, the courts have shown some zeal recently in holding directors to
high standards of fiduciary duty. 153 Moreover, unreasonably low fiduciary
standards would be counterproductive for a state seeking increased corporate franchise taxes through new incorporations there. Investors would
avoid the securities of companies incorporated in that state, causing these
securities to be valued lower in financial markets than securities of companies incorporated in states that provided reasonable protection to investors. This would induce companies to reincorporate out of the state with
unreasonably low fiduciary standards. 154
In light of the weakness of the preceding justifications for leniency in the
standard of care, the best explanation is the longstanding confusion over the
proper role of the board of directors. Although state corporation laws long
provided that the board was to manage the corporation, 155 courts recognized
that in practice boards do not do so and could not be expected to. With a few
specific exceptions, 156 state law required nothing more of the board than the
vague, general duty to manage. Since the only substantial task assigned to
the board by state law was one the board obviously did not and could not
fulfill, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable that courts refused to impose
a high standard of care on directors. This confusion over the board's role,
not the race to the bottom or judicial indifference to shareholder interests,
best explains the courts' attitudes. 157 If the monitoring model can eliminate
/
153
See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Maldonado v.
Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). See generally Arsht, supra note 132.
154
Lorie, supra note 66, at 57; Winter, supra note 71, at 256-58. See R. LARCOM,
THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 14-15 (1937) (footnote omitted):
West Virginia had a reputation ... for being the home of irresponsible ~orpora
tions. lt may have been this reputation which was responsible for the impression
which one of the gentlemen testifying before the United States Industrial Commission had that "corporations organized in West Virginia· have considerable
difficulty in placing their stocks and bonds.
See also Hyman, Do Lenient Stale Incorporation Laws Injure Minority Share!wlders?, in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 166, 168-69 (M. Johnson ed. 1978)
(prices of a corporation's stock do not drop when the corporation changes its place of
incorporation to Delaware). Professor Cary himself has recounted the story of a
South American ambassador in whose country public investors lacked confidence in
corporations because management considered itself to owe loyalty only to its relatives. Cary, supra note 3, at 671. But Professor Cary does not conclude from this
story that since shareholders were not fleeing Delaware corporations, Delaware's
corporation laws must not be detrimental to shareholders' interests.
155
See note 12 supra.
156
See note 145 supra.
157
See C. BRowN, supra note 17, at 5 ("A well-known corporate officer recently
-observed in public discussion, 'Most boards of directors I have been on don't know
exactly what they are supposed to do.'"); H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 225. See
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confusion over the board's role and provide directors with an important and
workable role, courts could reasonably require a more rigorous standard of
care in their performance.
Even if the courts had been willing to impose a more stringent director
duty of care, major obstacles remained to the imposition of personal liability.
First is the problem of proof of proximate cause. A plaintiff must show not
only that a director breached his duty of care, but also that this breach led to
an identifiable loss to the corporation. 15 8 Not surprisingly, plaintiffs have
rarely been able to prove proximate cause in cases not involving board
approval of specific transactions. Because directors are expected to do little
or nothing, proof that their failure to act with due care caused the corporation some identifiable loss is quite difficult. Although proof of proximate
cause is a rational requirement and deeply embedded in our jurisprudence,159 it has weakened the director's duty of care.
Even if it can be shown that a director failed to act with due care and that
this failure caused a corporate loss, .he may still be able to circumvent
personal liability through indemnification or insurance. Insurance policies
protect most directors and officers of public corporations against liabilities
arising out of their position, and most of the premiums for these policies are
paid by the corporation. 160 When suits are settled or in those rare cases in
which a director is held liable for negligence, resort to insurance may not
even be necessary. Some state indemnification statutes· are so broad and
vague that they might be construed to permit indemnification by the corporation even for amounts paid in settlement, thus placing on the shareholde'}-'
the burden of paying for a loss incurred by the director's failure to perform a

also C. STONE, supra note 119, at 141 ("there is almost no authoritative guide as to
what., exactly, the directors are supposed to be doing"); Leech & Mundheim, supra
note 20, at 1803 ("The confusion as to the role and responsibility of the corporate
director has precipitated serious debate.").
158
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 151 (1891); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614,
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.); H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234, at 456-57. This
requires proof not only that the board's act or omission caused a specific loss·, but
also perhaps that each individual defendant-director could have prevented the loss if
he had acted with due care. See Allied Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin,.325 Mass. 630,
91 N.E.2d 765 (1950) (director held not liable because, being unskilled, she could not
have discovered and prevented the misdeeds); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, §
1063.1 ("he is liable only for a loss that results from his negligence"); Dyson, supra
note 125, at 363-65; Comment, supra note 133, at 342 and cases cited in 342 n.12. But
see Coffee, supra note 101, at 1213 n.408.
159
See F. BACON, MAXIMS OF THE LAW, Reg. I, quoted in W. PROSSER, supra
note 128, § 42, at 244 n.63.
160 • • [Tjhe common practice has been for the corpomtion to pay 90 per cent of the
total premium and the director the remaining 10 per cent." Bishop, supra note 130, at
1090. Today, it is common for the corporation to pay the entire premium. W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 970.
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duty owed to themP 61 Although no court has embraced this absurd and
shocking result, insurance is really little different because it too places the
ultimate burden on the shareholders by having the corporation pay policy
premiums .162 These results negate the deterrent effect of liability for failure
to act with due care and, more importantly, they may well contribute in an
unmeasurable way to the judicial reluctance to impose stricter standards of
care by instilling a feeling that more rigorous standards would only stir up
more litigation for the benefit of lawyers with no corresponding benefit to
shareholders.
The duty of care has been further weakened by procedural obstacles to its
enforcement. Unless the director violates the federal securities laws,
thereby bringing the SEC into action, no public agency is likely to be willing
or able to sue. Of course, the directors are not likely to sue themselves
either. Thus, enforcement of the director's duties is relegated almost entirely
to shareholder derivative suits. 163 But an alleged fear of strike suits-that is,
suits brought not to benefit the corporation but for the purpose of being
bought off in a settlement from the defendants or the corporation solely to
avoid the nuisance of the suit-has prompted state legislatures and courts to
erect many barriers to the bringing of such suits. 164 These barriers discour161
See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 1083-84. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (1974) specifically permits indemnification of attorneys' fees and,
1I1 nonderivative suits, amounts paid in settlement, judgments, and fines if the
director "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation." Moreover, this indemnification
right is not exclusive. Jd. § 145(f). Section 145(b) says nothing about indemnification
of amounts paid in settlement of derivative suits. Thus, the question is still open in
Delaware. For an opinion that indemnification is not permitted in such cases, see
E. FoLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CoRPORATION LAw 100 (1972). The SEC has
opposed indemnification of directors and officers for violations of the federal securities laws. Note to SEC rule 460, 17. C.P.R. § 230.460 (1980).
162
Bishop, supra note 130, at 1090-91.
163
Dean Rostow has called the derivative suit "the most important procedure the
law has yet developed to police the internal affairs of corporations." Rostow, To
Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CoRPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 48 (E. Mason ed. 1959). Justice Jackson called it
"the chief regulator of corporate management." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541,548 (1949). See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,
371 (1942); N. LATTIN, supra note 131, § 115, at 457 ("The derivative suit is the
minority shareholders' one effective remedy against management's abuse of its
trusteeship.").
164
These obstacles include the following requirements: ownership of stock at the
commencement and during the pendency of the suit; ownership of stock at the time of
the alleged wrong (the so-called contemporaneous ownership requirement); allega~ion with particularity of the facts constituting the corporate cause of action (often
Interpreted to require the plaintiff in effect to plead evidence); demands on the board
and the shareholders to take action with respect to the alleged wrong or a showing
that such demands would be futile; fair representation of the shareholders by the
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age potential plaintiffs from bringing even meritorious derivative suits.
In sum, the duty of care has hitherto been an ineffective tool for requiring
directors to perform a meaningful function within the corporation. This
ineffectiveness has gone hand in hand, however, with the failure of the
received model of corporate governance to prescribe any meaningful role for
the board of directors. Thus, the question arises whether the duty of care can
be revamped and revived under a monitoring model that in theory provides a
sound role for the board.
C.

The Monitoring Model and Reviving the Duty of Care

By abandoning the unrealistic demand that the board manage the corporation and substituting for it the feasible demand that the board monitor
management's performance, the monitoring model eliminates most logical
objections to a rigorous duty of care. The illogical objections should follow
suit. Although legislation may be desirable on a few specific points, in most
respects the courts can easily eliminate the obstacles to a more rigorous duty
of care.
The claim that courts are incompetent to decide issues of business policy
has already been rejected in light of the many complicated issues courts
decide in other areas of the law . 165 The fear that a rigorous duty of care
would discourage qualified persons from serving as outside directors should
dissipate considerably if directors are given workable tasks instead of the
vague, unrealistic mandate the law now gives them. We are better off
without those directors who will serve only if ''no effort of any kind is
required." 166 Because monitoring requires more effort than directors have
traditionally exerted, 167 the directors may demand higher fees, 168 but the
benefits of monitoring should exceed its costs. Future boards may have to be
plaintiff; provision by plaintiff of security for expenses of the corporation (including
attorneys' fees); indemnification of corporate personnel for litigation expenses;
bringing of suit within the period of a short statute of limitations for certain actions
against directors, officers, and shareholders; and reimbursement of defendants' expenses. H. HENN, supra note 45, §§ 359, 361-367, 372, 378; N. LATTIN, supra note
131, §§ 105-06.
165
See text following note 140 supra.
166
See note 148 supra (quoting TIME, Oct. 5, 1962, at 96, quoted in H. HENN,
supra note 45, § 234, at 454 n.3)).
167
H. KoONTZ, supra note 13, at 151, 232; Goldschrnid, supra note 49, at 175;
Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1829.
168
See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 80 (suggesting that directors' compensation
"should be, in most cases, much higher than at present" and should be ratably
equivalent to the corporation's senior executives); H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at
243; Lohnes, The Selection and Compensation of Outside Directors, in DuTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 67, 73-74 (A. Cohen & R. Loeb eds.
1978); Mundheim, supra note 49, at 181. Some corporations are now paying much
higher directors' fees. Dean Brown reported in 1976 that Texas Instruments was
paying some directors about $1,000 per day. C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 33.
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smaller because of the limited number of qualified directors, 169 but this is no
problem-boards are now unnecessarily large.l1°
Under the monitoring model, a stringent duty of care should not produce
unduly cautious corporate policies. Since the board will not make corporate
policy, it will not be in a position to discourage reasonable risktaking; the
board will merely monitor the performance of management, and management
will continue to have ample market incentives to take reasonable risks. 171
Moreover, if they do have any influence over corporate policies, outside
directors themselves will have certain market incentives to encourage the
corporation to take reasonable risks. 172
The purported competition among states for chartering fees should not
cause hesitation in state courts to impose a substantial duty of care. Indeed,
if monitoring truly helps protect shareholder interests and improve corporate
performance, states would have a motivation to adopt the model in order to
induce corporations to incorporate there . 173
The monitoring model would also substantially mitigate the problem of
director reliance on officers, accountants, counsel, and others. With the
board limited to monitoring management, the reliance issue will only atise
with respect to monitoring, not company management or any other matter.
As to monitoring, the board would still have some right to rely on factual
data provided by management, but in reaching its ultimate decisions the
board obvj6usly could not rely on the very management it was supposed to
evaluate. By limiting the scope of the board's duties to monitoring, courts
will be in a better position to impose a more stringent duty to inquire. Courts
have been reluctant to require directors to go beyond information presented
to them by management because outside directors lacked the time and staff
to investigate all matters independently and because independent investigations would interfere with orderly management. 174 By restricting the duty to
inquire to matters of monitoring, this problem would be greatly reduced.
169
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., supra note 18, at 4; H. KOONTZ, supra note 13,
at 151-54. Cf. C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 88-90 (supply of outside directors is
inelastic only in short run); H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 228, 236-37 (shortage is
largely a product of too narrow a view of what makes a good director). But see
Friendly, supra note 49, at 529 (there are enough qualified outside directors).
17
C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 92; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 121 (the ideal
board should have no more than 13 directors). See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INc.,
supra note 18, at 4. Committees should be small, generally with no more than three or
four members; C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 65.
171
See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
172
See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
173
See Winter, supra note 71, at 255-58.
174
See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 617, (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.), in
Which the court said a director "had no right to inteiject himself personally" into a
dispute between officers that helped lead to the corporation's demise. See also
Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra .note 44, at 1603 (" [A]ctual operation is a
function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to overseeing such
operation.").
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The monitoring model will not solve the problem of proof of proximate
cause. Indeed, although the problem may be somewhat mitigated by the
reduction of the scope of directors' duties, it may also be exacerbated
because it will be extremely difficult to prove that an identifiable corporate
loss resulted from a failure to monitor. For example, failure to replace an
incompetent management will damage the corporation, but to prove the
extent of the loss by showing how much better a different, more competent
management would have done will usually be impossible. However, effective enforcement of the monitoring model does not necessarily require
frequent imposition of personal liability on the directors. Both market
forces 175 and suits for equitable relief can motivate directors to act prudently
and these can be at least as effective as holding directors liable for negligence. A derivative suit seeking an injunction avoids not only the issue of
loss causation but also the problem of ultimately shifting liability back to the
shareholders through indemnification or insurance. 176 It also avoids the
potential problem of damages being excessive in relation to the magnitude of
the director's sins. 177 Furthermore, suits for equitable relief promott: a
dialogue between the courts and corporate boards about the boards' proper
functions, a dialogue that is especially desirable while the monitoring model
is in its formative stages.
Stressing injunctive actions would not, if combined with a more rigorous
duty of care, eviscerate sanctions for breach. First, the prospect of being
sued is itself a substantial deterrent for many corporate executives who
serve as outside directors.l1 8 The further prospect of being enjoined for
failure to perform one's duties increases the deterrence.
More important, courts can use their injunctive powers in imaginative
ways to improve corporate governance. So far, courts have barely scratched
the surface of these powers. For example, courts have occasionally enjoined
defendants from serving as directors, but more often they have held that
they lack the power to remove directors, except perhaps for fraud. 179 Such
See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
See note 162 mid accompanying text supra.
177
In the case of any substantial public corporation engaged in transactions worth
millions of dollars, a damage action for mere negligence could result in crushing
liability. Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 143, at 3 n.1 (examples of excessive damage
cases).
1 7 8 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 562 ("His reputation and
prestige in his community may be injured by the bringing of the action alone."); Cary,
Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 418 (1962) (corporate
managers are very responsive to public opinion)·.
m Some courts have removed directors pursuant to their inherent equitable
powers. Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 30 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1963). Some courts have suggested in dicta that they have such powers.
Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 773 (3d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947) (no removal unless directors guilty of
fraud); Gettinger v. Heaney, 127 So. 195 (Ala. 1930) (no removal unless other
175
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passivity is unwarranted. Indeed, even if courts feel they cannot or should
not order reform of a corporation's governance structure where no violation
of fiduciary duties has been shown, such reform should be considered and,
where appropriate, mandated when fiduciary duties have been violated.
Consider, for example, the well-known case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co. 180 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the director
defendants had not breached their duty of care in failing to discover antitrust
violations by several corporate officers. Commentary on the case· has focused on whether the court erred in failing to assess damages . 181 The more
fruitful inquiry would be whether the court erred in deciining to order
appropriate injunctive relief. If failure to discover the officers' misdeeds
resulted from the directors' incompetence or lack of time or independence,
the court could have enjoined the directors from continuing in office and
taken steps to see that their replacements would be more effective. If the
solution was ''an internal control system to prevent repeated antitrust violations," 182 rather than holding the directors liable for failure to install such a
system (perhaps only to see the directors then made whole by indemnification or insurance), 183 the court should have ordered the board to install such
a system. Such injunctions could provide both guidance to corporate boards
and practical experience on the basis of which courts might then issue
injunctions where the corporation had not yet suffered any loss. 184
Precedents for this approach are found in the corporate governance reforms the SEC has obtained as ancillary relief in many consent decrees. 185 It
remedies inadequate); DeGarmo v. Goldman, 19 Cal. 2d 755, 123 P.2d I, 4 (1942);
Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128,251 N.W. 421 (Mich. 1933) (no removal unless
directors guilty of fraud); see Brudney, FiduciGiy Ideology in Transactions Affecting
Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 281 (1966); Annot., 124 A.L.R. 364
(1940). In some states the power to remove directors has been conferred by statute.
CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 304 (Deering 1977); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 55-27(g) (1975); N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 706(d) (McKinney 1976); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1405(c) (Purdon 1967). Other courts have held that they lack power to remove
directors. Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 146 (1860); In re Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d
862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956). Professor Stone has recommended removal of directors for breach of their fiduciary duties, but he contemplates removal pursuant to a
federal statute or rules of a new Federal Corporations Commission. C. STONE, supra
note 119, at 149. The view of the author of this Article is that state courts already have
the power not only to remove directors but to order further corporate governance
reforms. See note 187 infra.
180
41 Del. ch: 78, 188 A.2d 125 (S. Ct. 1963).
181
Cary, supra note 3, at 683.
182 /d.
183
See notes 160-62 and accompanying text supra.
184
Of course, breach of some duty would have to be shown, but failure to institute
monitoring mechanisms may, in light of future experience, be deemed. to violate the
duty of care even though no loss has yet occurred.
185
See notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra.
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may be questioned whether obtaining these decrees is beyond the Commission's statutory powers, 186 but this criticism could not be leveled at state
courts g_!"anting similar relief. 18 7 Moreover, the SEC has acted in part because the states have declined to act. If the SEC is not to preempt state
law in corporate governance, 188 it may be necessary for state courts to play a
more active role.
Although injunctive actions should be stressed in enforcing the duty of
care, damage actions should not be abandoned altogether. The rules pertaining to damage actions, however, should be revised to make them more
effective and reasonable. Professor Conard wisely suggests that derivative
suits against directors for breach of the duty of care would be more effective
if insurance and indemnification against liability were eliminated, 189 and if
damages were limited, perhaps, to a director's compensation from the corporation for one year . 190 This reform would eliminate the prospect of Draconian damages for mere carelessness and with it some of the reluctance of
courts to impose damages at all. It would also prevent directors from shifting
to the shareholders, the persons to whom they owe the duty of care, the
burden of liability for breach of the duty. Although forbidding insurance and
indemnification would tend to discourage even competent persons from
serving as directors, 191 limits on personal liability would have the opposite
effect.
Limiting damages might occasionally leave insufficient funds to pay
for the plaintiff's attorneys' fees, the customary practice in derivative
suits, 192 but such cases would probably be rare. 193 Moreover, an award of
H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 189, 197-98; Comment, supra note 96.
Although courts have been reluctant to order broad injunctive relief in derivative suits (which are proceedings in equity), there is no doubt that the power to order
such relief exists. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, §§ 6027-6042; H. HENN, supra
note 45, § 375. This power permits a court to install a receiver or to order dissolution.
See note 179 supra. A fortiori, courts have the power to require corporations to
institute the changes necessary to enable the directors to fulfill their duty of care.
188 One commentator has opined that "[d]uring the past few years, the SEC has
been carefully laying the groundwork for extending its jurisdictional reach to preempt
the state corporation laws." Rosenfeld, Corporate Governance, 7 SEc. REG. L.J.
171, 172 (1979).
18 9 Conard, supra note 42, at 913-15.
186

187

19o
191

Jd.

See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 38 (threat of personal liability now deters
many from serving as directors); Conard, supra note 42, at 899, 903; note 146 and
accompanying text supra. Contra, E. McSwEENEY, supra note 20, at 106 ("it is
widespread frustration [with "the impotence of their positions"], more than fear of
liability suits, that is most responsible for the decline in the number of persons willing
to accept directorships.").
192 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 938-39; H. HENN, supra note
45, § 377.
193 If courts limit damage awards as Professor Conard suggests, a major source of
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damages will often be accompanied by an injunction benefitting the corporation; this would warrant the payment of attorneys' fees by the corporation if
damages are insufficient. 194 Although requiring the corporation to pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees in effect shifts fees to the shareholders, these fees will be
much cheaper than indemnification or insurance of the directors against
liability. 19 5
The procedural obstacles to plaintiffs in derivative suits that exist
today will remain under the monitoring model. 196 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to propose a comprehensive solution· to the problem of permitting meritorious derivative suits without encouraging frivolous strike suits.
Legislation will be necessary to remedy some problems. 197 However, revamping the duty of care under a monitoring model of corporate governance
should make the duty more rational from the perspective of both shareholders and directors and thereby reduce the fears of abuse that have prompted
creation of many obstacles to derivative suits. 198 For example, by giving
directors a feasible set of duties, the monitoring model may enhance judicial
belief that derivative suits to enforce these duties are not merely strike suits
brought for the benefit of plaintiffs' attorneys.
By expressly relieving directors of the duty to manage, the monitoring
model facilitates imposing this duty on the officers. Not only will the duty to
manage be placed squarely on the executive team, but the board will also
have an incentive to assign specific managerial tasks to each executive, or at
least ensure that such an assignment has been made by the chief executive
officer. 199 Although courts and commentators have long recognized that
corporate officers owe a duty of care, 200 the officers have rarely been held
contention will be eliminated, making settlements more likely and trials less timeconsuming. Plaintiffs' attorneys already have strong incentives to settle. Alleghany
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff'd en bane by an
equally divide'd court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28
(1966). Prohibiting insurance of directors and officers would increase the incentive
for defendants to settle unless they were confident of exoneration at trial.
194
Most states now authorize such payments. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
supra note 20, at 939; H. HENN, supra note 45, § 377, at 795-96.
195
Insurance, for example, will often cover both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys' fees, and perhaps amounts paid in settlement or judgment as well. See Lloyd's
Open Market Form of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance (ALS (D5)) § 2(c),
reprinted in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 966.
196
See note 164 supra.
197
Many of the obstacles-including the requirements of security for expenses,
contemporaneous ownership, and demand on the board-are imposed by statute and
therefore can only be removed by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 626(b) & (c) (contemporaneous ownership and demand on board) and § 627
(security for expenses) (McKinney 1976).
198
See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 525, at 399-400 (1976)
(abuses led to imposition of many procedural obstacles to derivative suits).
199
See notes 284-86 and accompanying text infra.
200
3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1032; H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234. See
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liable for breach of this duty 201 because under the received model of corporate governance the board was supposed to manage and the officers merely
carried out the board's orders. The courts were also reluctant to hold the
board liable for mismanagement, however, because the board was incapable
of managing. 202 By assigning the officers the duty to manage and ensuring that
specific management tasks are delegated to specific officers, the monitoring
model remedies this problem.
Moreover, by requiring the officers to manage, the monitoring model
eliminates many justifications for the evisceration of the duty to manage
carefully. Under the received model, the courts insisted on a common
standard of care for both inside and outside directors; rather than selecting a
high standard that would have been appropriate for inside directors, they
invariably adopted a low standard appropriate for outside directors.2°3 With
management delegated to the officers, there is no reason not to insist on a
higher standard of care. A review of the factors that have contributed to the
weakening of the duty to manage carefully make this apparent. The defense
of reliance on information and opinions of others 204 makes sense with
respect to management by outside directors because they lack independent
sources of information and the time and expertise to form opinions on
difficult management questions. Not so with the officers; their right to rely
should bt< strictly circumscribed. Another justification for avoiding a stringent duty to manage carefully was that it would deter the best outside
directors from serving-directors' fees have never been large enough, in and
of themselves, to induce the best to serve, and the position's honor could
quickly be outweighed by any substantial threat of liability. However, these
concerns are much less compelling, if applicable at all, when officers are
involved; a stringent duty of care will not prompt officers to resign to
become something other than corporate executives. If outside directors
were required to manage, a rigorous duty of care might force them to be too
cautious because no potential reward would offset the potential liability for
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw§ 715(h) (McKinney 1976). Section 35 of the ModelBusiness
Corporation Act did not include officers within the statutory duty of care because of
problems in an officer's right to rely, though the Comment to section 35 noted that ''a
. non-director offic.~r may have a duty of care similar to that of a director as set forth in
section 35." MonEL Bus. CoRP. ACT. ANN.§ 35, Par. I, at 256 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.).
201
3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1032 ("Most of the decisions involving
the question as to the required degree of care are expressly limited to directors, and
there is very little law as to the degree of care required of other officers.") See also 3
id. § 991, at 522.
202
See notes 18-29 and accompanying text supra.
203 This has been particularly evident with respect to the board's duty to super~ise, where the courts have based standards of care on the outside director who
devotes little time to the business. See Graham, 41 Del. Ch. at 84-86, 188 A.2d at
130-31.
204

See notes 142-45 and accompanying text supra.
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taking substantial risks. The officers, however, would not be too cautious
because they have large potential rewards for risk-taking in the form of
bonuses, larger salaries, enhanced value of stock and stock options, greater
job security, and greater value in the job market if ventures succeed. 205
Proof of proximate cause has created major problems under the received
model. 206 The monitoring model can ameliorate these problems if not eliminate them completely. Since all managerial tasks rest with the entire board
under the traditional model, a director's duty as to any single task is necessarily spread thin. If each managerial task were assigned to a specific officer,
this problem would diminish. Even a reasonably diligent outside director
cannot be held to a high standard of effort or expertise in making management decisions, but an officer can be.
Although obstacles to derivative suits will remain under the monitoring
model, the rationalization of liability outlined above should help persuade
courts and perhaps legislatures to reduce those obstacles. 207 Derivative suits
could then become an effective tool, working in tandem with monitoring by
the board, toward the desired end of effective corporate governance.
D.

Summation

The courts' refusal to impose a rigorous duty of care is best explained by
the confusion generated by the traditional model of corporate governance.
The monitoring model of corporate governance removes this confusion and
thereby eliminates most objections to a rigorous duty of care. It remains to
be determined, however, to what extent a court could in practice require and
enforce monitoring.
VI.

TOWARD ENFORCEABLE STANDARDS FOR MONITORING

Although adoption of the monitoring model of corporate governance
clears the way for a shift in judicial attitudes towards the duty of care, courts
cannot effectively enforce the duty unless there are workable, enforceable
standards for monitoring. Without such standards, the monitoring model
may become little more than a pious wish that the directors do something
good, with no penalty if they persist in doing virtually nothing.
An initial question is where courts can find authority to require directors
to monitor. The command, now contained in many state statutes, that the
corporation shall be managed ''under the direction of'' a board of directors208 could be easily construed to require monitoring once courts concede
that this is the one important function that the board can perform. 209 In the
205

See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 158-59 and accompanying text supra.
207
See note 198 and accompanying text supra.
208
See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
2o9 s
M
ee
. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 156-68 (discussion of importance of
monitoring as main board function).
206
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few states in which statutes still provide that the board shall manage the
corporation, it may be a bit harder for the courts to reach this result-but not
unduly so, because of the general agreement that boards do not and cannot
manage. Indeed, court-imposed duties already anticipate certain aspects of
monitoring. For example, courts often recognize a directorial duty to supervise subordiiiates 210 and to inquire when put on notice that the corporation is
being mismanaged. 211 If the courts can fashion a duty to supervise and to
inquire about mismanagement, they should be able, supported by recent
developments in corporate governance theory, to fashion a duty to monitor. 212 Whether this broad duty can lead to concrete, enforceable rules will
be discussed below.
Most proponents of monitoring identify discrete duties the board would
perform and advocate the discharge of these duties through a system of
board committees. 213 Corporate practice has recently moved in a similar
direction.21 4 Accordingly, the remainder of this section will be organized
into discussion of these duties-evaluation of management's performance
and determination of management's compensation; evaluation of incumbent
directors and nomination of new directors; overseeing corporate accounting
practices and audits; monitoring compliance with the law; allocating managerial duties to officers; and reviewing interested transactions. In practice,
much board work must be delegated to committees if, as is contemplated by
the monitoring model, part-time outside directors are to dominate the
board. 215 To perform any single major monitoring function effectively will
require a greater time commitment than outside directors have previously
given. 216 Without committees, no director could properly perform all these
functions and yet serve only part-time.
210

See H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234.
See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1920); Graham, 41 Del. Ch. at 84,
188 A.2d at 130 (S. Ct. 1963) ("[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and
integ!ity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that
something is wrong."); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1078.
212 See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 21 ("'The dictum in state charters that the
corporation 'shall be managed by the board of directors' can only mean that general
control and direction of corporate affairs and the supervision of the corporate
officers, to whom the day-to-day management is delegated, belongs to the board.").
Cf. Mundheim, supra note 49, at 181 (courts might hold that ordinary prudence
requires directors of a public corporation to have or establish an audit committee).
213
C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 62, 64--65; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at
170-71; Hams, Directors of Industrial Companies: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW.
1235, 1239-40 (1976).
214
See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra. As to the frequency of compensation, nominating, and audit committees, see notes 219, 252, & 265 infra.
215
See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 62, 64-65; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at
170-71; Harris, supra note 213, at 139-40; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at
1807-09.
216
See notes 26 & 167 supra.
211
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Evaluation of Management's Performance and Determination of
Management's Compensation

The core concept of the monitoring model is that the board, though
incapable of managing the corporation, can and should monitor management's performance. 217 Accordingly, the key function of the monitoring
board is to evaluate management's performance. Corollary duties include
rewarding superior management with increased compensation, discharging
incompetent managers, and filling management vacancies. Many corporations have recently established compensation committees, 218 but few have
authority to suggest the discharge of managers, to fill vacancies, or even to
evaluate management's performance. 219 Moreover, existing compensation
committees often include inside directors. 220 Thus, outside directors now
rarely evaluate management's performance and, except in extreme emergencies,221 do not discharge managers or fill managerial vacancies.
Business commentators discussing evaluation of management's performance have generally advocated management by objectives and appraisal by
results. Management by objectives entails the establishment of quantifiable
goals against which the managers' performance will be measured. Appraisal
by results is the subsequent evaluation of the managers' performance, taking
into account not only success or failure in meeting the established goals but
also external factors affecting that success or failure but not anticipated
when the goals were set. 222 Some have objected that quantifiable goals may
217

C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 26, 30; E. McSwEENEY, supra note 20, at 105;
Conrad, supra note 42, at 917; Mace, supra note 26, at 21; Manning, supra note 37, at
27-28.
218
One study showed that between 1973 and 1977, the proportion of surveyed
corporations that had compensation committees grew from 76.1% to 87.6%. KoRN/
FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18, at II.
219
The duty traditionally assigned to the compensation committee is to determine
whether the corporation's executive compensation is adequate to attract and retain
highly qualified management and to encourage "extraordinary effort through incentive awards." ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the
Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837, 1848 (1979). A few corporations do, however, encourage board evaluation of management. See R. MuELLER, BoARD CoMPASS 73 (1979) (discussing Pillsbury Co. and Massachusetts Mutual Life ins. Co.); R.
MUELLER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DIRECTORS 48 (1978) (discussing Continental Telephone Corp.). Most boards do not, however: evaluate management's performance in
any depth. C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 26.
220
In a recent survey by the SEC, over 40% of the companies with compensation
committees had at least one committee member with a relationship listed in Item 6(b)
of Schedule 14A. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,158, Table 15, SEC Docket
155!, 1573 (Feb. 5, 1981).
221
M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 65, 70. But see Bauer, Why Big Business Is Firing
the Boss, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6, at 22, col. I, indicating that dismissal of
high-level executives is becoming more common.
222
H. KOONTZ, APPRAISING MANAGERS AS MANAGERS 80 (1971); H. SMITH
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work well at lower echelons, where more tangible tasks are performed, but
not at the level of top management; nonetheless, they argue that management can be evaluated as to its qualitative performance of more nebulous
tasks; such as planning, staffing, and discharging corporate social responsibilities. 223
This approach to evaluating management's performance arguably has much
to recommend it. Evaluation of lower level managers by top management is
an inherent part of any but the smallest business. In fact, a central feature in
the evolution of the modern multidivisional public corporation was the" creation of an executive management divorced from operations and devoted
solely to long range planning and to evaluating the performance of operating
units. 224 One problem not solved by the multidivisional form is that executive management may be incompetent or may pursue nonprofit goals, such
as growth, with no restraint other than the threat of takeover 225-a threat
inadequate by itself to ensure competence or pursuit of maximum profits. 22 6
Evaluation .of management by nonmanagement directors is a logical exten~
sion of the multidivisional form and may help solve this problem. 227 The existence of an independent board committee which would evaluate
management and mete out appropriate reward or punishment and which
might announce its conclusions publicly 228 should itself motivate manage& P. BROUWER, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 77 (1977);
Wikstrom, Management by Objectives or Appraisal by Results, in MoDERN MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND IDEAS 436 (D. Hampton ed. 1969).
223 H. SMITH & P. BROUWER, supra note 222, at 81 ("A simple, quantitative
approach to 'management by objectives' may work well at lower echelons ... but it
is likely to be inappropriate at higher levels in the organizations."); Burton, supra
note 68, at 486.
224 A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 6-12 passim (1977). See generally A. CHANDLER, supra note
15, at 1-17.
22 5 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 75, at 165-66.
22 6 See notes 71 & 75 and accompanying text supra.
227 Another approach to evaluating management is the management audit. Commentators do not completely agree on what this is. Most see it as an evaluation to be
conducted by independent certified public accountants, but whether this audit would
be intended primarily to rate management or merely to give it advice is not clear. See
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 210-11; H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 179 and
authorities cited at 179 n.6; Burton, supra note 68; Campfield, Management Auditing: Pathway to Efficient, Economical Operations, 35 INTERNAL AUDITOR 33 (Apr.
1978). Others see the management audit as being performed or commissioned by
outside director. See Smith, Pe1jormance Audits by Outside Directors, in CoRPORATE DIRECTORS CoNFERENCE, THE CoRPORATE DIRECTOR: NEw RoLES, NEW
RESPONSIBILITIES 65 (1975); Wilde & Vancil, Pe1jormance Audits by Outside Directors, 50 HARV. Bus. REv. 112 (July-Aug. 1972).
228 Public disclosure of board evaluations of management might increase management's hostility to the board and opposition to monitoring. There is also the
danger that public disclosures of corporate goals might be deemed predictions that
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ment to perlorm better. It should also improve management's planning and
control, and help to clarify organization roles. 229 The benefits of board
evaluation of management will be greatest in those companies in which
competition in product and capital markets is least effective, because it
would furnish rewards and punishments that these markets ordinarily provide. If securities analysts believe the board to be truly competent and
independent, the board's evaluation could become a significant piece of
market information. 230 Management compensation structures and the capital
market's preoccupation with short-term perlormance currently force management to stress short-term results. 231 However, the board can encourage
management to give greater emphasis to long range goals, especially if
capital markets come to rely on board evaluations so that stock prices and
takeover threats do not depend so heavily on short-term profits. 2 3 2
would give rise to securities law violations unless carefully framed. On the other
hand, disclosure might serve as an additional incentive for management to perform
well. Moreover, hoard evaluations cannot become market information, see text
accompanying note 230 infra, unless publicly disclosed. If the board's evaluation
becomes material information, SEC rule lOb-5 would prevent insiders from trading in
the corporation's stock until the evaluation was disclosed. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In
fact, disclosure might be required even if the insiders were not trading in the stock.
See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 83, at 949-50.
229 H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 81-83.
230
This is because the board, as part of the corporate governance structure, has
better access to corporate information and can get better cooperation from management than market analysts. Therefore, it can make a better informed evaluation.
0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 146-47 (1975). The importance of the evaluation of management in investment decisions cannot be doubted. Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964); New
Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus. LAw. 505, 530-31
(1973) (ABA Panel) (remarks of Harold Marsh, Jr.). It is not far-fetched to imagine
that markets would rely on outside directors. Shareholders and underwriters have
insisted that public companies add outsiders to their boards. H. KooNTZ, supra note
13, at 130-32.
231
Indeed, the obsession of American corporate managers with short~term profits
has itself become an obsession with commentators on American business. During
just a few weeks while this Article was in preparation the author noted the following in
the New York Times: Hayes, Managers Adopting Long-Term Outlook, Jan. 11,
1981, § 12, at40, col. 1; Arenson, Economists: Influential But Erratic, Jan. 11,1981, §
12, at 42, col. 3; Thurow, Productivity: Japan Has a Better Way, Feb. 8, 1981, § 3, at
2, col. 4; Interview with Reginald H. Jones, How to Improve Management, Jan. 27,
1981, § D, at 2, col. 1; Bauer, supra note 221, at 86, col. 4 (quoting an expert on
executive compensation: "Contracts have, more and more, called for bonuses tied
to short-term performance . . . . ").
232
See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 6 (boards may take a longer range view than
does management). Professor Williamson notes the possibility that internal auditors
may, because of their superior access to information and cooperation, be better able
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Corporate governance would improve substantially if board evaluation of
management produced all these benefits and if the duty of care or some othe
legal norm required boards to evaluate management effectively and inde~
pendently. Unfortunately, many problems exist with both the theory of
board evaluation and the enforcement of a duty to evaluate.
An initial problem is determining who will set management's goals. Management, not the outside directors, currently sets goals and performs other
important functions. 233 Professor Eisenberg believes that the board should
set goals and denies that this would involve the board in the corporation's
long-range planning. In his view, "it is one thing, for example, to demand a
certain return on capital; it is another to decide on the strategy and tactics
which promise to yield that return.' ' 234 The dichotomy between setting goals
and choosing means to attain those goals is not, however, as clear as
Professor Eisenberg suggests. Management can be expected to argue that
the board has set goals too high. 235 Disagreements between the board and
management over corporate goals could not only disrupt the firm but also
diminish market reliance on the board's evaluation by raising questions
about its validity. Independent objective standards to which the board or
management could refer in setting goals or evaluating performance are quite
rare. Two or more firms are seldom so similar that a useful comparison of
their results is possible. 236 Information about competitors, especially concerning long-range plans, may be difficult to obtain at all or, at least, in time
to make useful comparisons. 237 Even comparisons with a competitor
not
be very helpful if the quality of the competitor's management is unknownthat is, outperforming a competitor means little if the competitor is incompetently managed.
Professor Eisenberg's dichotomy also ignores risk factors in setting

will

to encourage risk-taking than the capital markets. But he also notes some doubt
whether these "potential advantages . . . actually induce more aggressive risktaking." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 230, at 146 n.10.
233 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
2 3 4 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 165.
1 35 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 86 ("(Tjhere is a natural tendency for
subordinates to build padding into goals to assure they will exceed them."); E.
McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 107 ("Even with a very cooperative CEO to work
with, setting up a specific table of performance standards is likely to be a touchy,
complex and unpleasant job."); H. SMITH & P. BROUWER, supra note 222, at 77
("There is always potential for conflict in the process of setting objectives.").
Although management's self-interest makes such objections suspect, management's
superior knowledge of the company would lend credibility to its arguments.
236 See Wilde & Vancil, supra note 227, at 113. See also Speech by SEC Chairman
Harold Williams, supra note 67, at 10 ("It is, of course, impossible to generalize the
appropriate performance standards applicable to every corporation. Nor can standardized check-lists adequately meet the individual needs of particular enterprises.").
237 See Friendly, supra note 49, at 530.
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financial goals. Higher goals require taking greater risks. 238 In setting goals,
the board would thus profoundly influence corporate policy and perhaps lead
the corporation to ruin if, for example, unreasonably high goals forced
management to pursue unduly risky policies. High short-term profitability
goals could force management to pursue unwise policies regarding research
and development, maintenance and repair, accounting procedures, or other
matters that would be very detrimental in the long-term. 239 If the board does
not want management to disregard the future completely, it must set goals
for product, plant, and market development and similar matters in addition
to short-term profit. But selecting matters which management must concentrate on involves the board even more deeply in corporate planning. In sum,
setting goals will invite disputes between management and the board. Moreover, it will necessarily require the board to make policy, in contradiction of
the tenet that the board is competent only to evaluate management, not itself
to manage.
The requirement to set goals also creates a tendency to stress quantifiable, short-term factors in order to facilitate a quick objective determination whether the goals have been met. 240 The tendency is understandable for
several reasons. First, it is difficult to verify that nonquantifiable objectives
have been met. 241 Second, setting long-range goals is difficult because longterm conditions are much harder to predict than are short-term conditions.
And finally, both the evaluators and the evaluated need regular, fairly
frequent evaluations if either is to benefit thereby. Nonetheless, the tendency to stress short-term quantifiable factors negates some important presumed benefits of monitoring. It not only defeats the goal of encouraging fair
consideration of long-range and nonquantifiable objectives but actually further diverts management from these objectives-that is, it prompts management to concentrate on matters which will be evaluated, at the expense of
other objectives. 242
238

To accept greater risk investors demand higher expected returns. J. VAN
HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 63-65 (4th ed. 1977). It follows that
to aim for higher returns one must accept greater risk.
m See Bauer, supra note 221, at 86-87, for a description of how a CEO can boost
short-term profits at the expense of long-run profits.
240
See H. KoONTZ, supra note 222, at 86, 89-90, 96; Speech by SEC Chairman
Harold Williams, supra note 67, at 16 ("In many corporations the board relies
exclusively on current performance figures to determine the corporation's position,
as well as to evaluate and reward management. This situation compounds management's own frequent tendency to have a short-term, bottom-line oriented
focus-a myopia which could have a severely negative impact on the corporation's
future."). Meaningless financials complicate the problem. But see R. SLOMA, How
TO MEASURE MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 3-4 (1980); Wilde & Vancil, supra note
227, at 115-16.
241
See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 95-96, 104-05, 110-11; Burton, supra note
68, at 490.
242
See H~ KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 87-89; Wikstrom, supra note 222, at 439-40.
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Evaluation of results is invariably complicated by conditions unforeseen
when the goals were set. 243 When goals are not met, management is especially likely to blame unexpected conditions. This places the board in an
awkward position: if it rejects this plea, squabbles between the board and
management will follow; if it makes concessions, market reliance on its
evaluations may be undermined by doubts as to the board's independence,
vigor, or competence. If goals are not quantified, the board must still determine whether the goals have been met, which raises the possibility of
further disputes between board and management.
To enforce the duty to monitor, courts may be able to impose some
procedural standards on directors with respect to evaluating management.
For example, a court might hold that the duty of care, including the duty to
monitor, requires that the board establish formal mechanisms to evaluate
management and perhaps even establish goals as part of these mechanisms.
By requiring evaluators both to spend a reasonable amount of time evaluating management and to have no conflicts of interest, the court could in effect
require boards to establish evaluation committees composed entirely of
outside directors. These requirements might substantially improve board
behavior. Independent-minded directors may now hesitate to evaluate man~
agement for fear that this may be deemed adversarial and therefore inappropriate. 244 A legal requirement that boards evaluate management would overcome this reluctance. Directors too timid to monitor might decide to resign.
Most directors are competent businessmen who, if they are to do ajob at all,
want to do it well; therefore, if courts require boards to establish mechanisms to evaluate managements, many boards will perform the task as
energetically and competently as possible. Despite the difficulties with
evaluating that were discussed above, these evaluations will be preferable to
the current total absence of independent evaluation of management.
But the problems courts will face in trying to impose any substantive
standards on board evaluations will probably limit the benefits described
above. As we observed, there are no objective standards for setting goals,
determining whether they were met, or, if they were not, why not. 245 If a
board will not evaluate management carefully and objectively, it can
nonetheless produce a large paper record of its activities, thereby conveying
the appearance of a good faith effort. Unless the directors are so careless as
to leave evidence of bad faith in the record, a court will find it almost
243

See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 87-88; Wilde & Vancil, supra note 227, at

114.
244 Corporate Director's Guidebook: Comments Submitted by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, 33 Bus. LAW. 321,322,326-27 (1977). "The monitoring
posited by the Corporate Director's Guidebook could lead to an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust," "of caution and hostility." !d. at 326-27.
245 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 110-11, 179; E. McSwEENEY, supra note
20, at 106-07; Burton, supra note 68, at 486, 490; Wilde & Vancil, supra note 227, at
114.
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impossible, except in the most extreme cases, to hold that the board has
acted negligently in its evaluations.
The problem of establishing substantive judicial standards will also afflict
judicial review of executive compensation. Indeed, this has long been the
case in both the corporate and tax law areas. Since managements control
most public corporations, 246 and thus set their own salaries, one would
expect such salaries frequently to be excessive. Although all courts agree
that compensation must be reasonable,2 47 and although the cases enumerate
factors relevant to reasonableness, 248 courts almost invariably refuse to hold
compensation excessive. 249 Some courts have expressly despaired of finding
any satisfactory yardstick by which to measure the reasonableness of compensation. 250 Independent boards as envisioned by the monitoring model
could make executive compensation more reasonable on their own initiative.
Courts could encourage this by demanding the procedures described above,
but it would probably be unworkable to force boards to scale back executive
compensation by imposing substantive limits.
In sum, although evaluation of management and determination of its
compensation by an independent board or board committee may somewhat
improve corporate governance, the benefits are unlikely to be great. The
difficulties are considerable in both effectuating the directors' tasks and
enforcing the duty to evaluate and to set compensation.
B.

Noinination of Directors

For a board to function effectively, its members must be both competent
and independent of management. Although monitoring adds no problems to
the issue of determining who is independent, it increases the importance of
246

See notes 13-28 and accompanying text supra.
See H. HENN, supra note 45, § 245, at 487-88 and cases cited in 488 n.16.
248
See 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 2133, at 576-77, and cases cited therein; 2
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CoRPORATE EXECUTIVE
855-63 (3d ed. 1962) (listing factors considered in close corporation cases). The issue
has been litigated most frequently in the federal income tax area in connection with
the deduction of alleged salaries. See authorities cited in H. HENN, supr,a note 45,
§ 245, at 488 n.16.
249
"In reading the cases, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the courts
will go to almost any length to avoid a clear holding on the reasonableness of
compensation. They seem bold in pronouncing amounts unreasonable only when
they have already found some other basis for decision." 2 G. WASHINGTON & V.
ROTHSCHILD, supra note 248, at 866-67; accord, 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 43,
§ 2133, at 575 ("The Courts are loath to interfere even though the amount may appear
to be in excess of the value of the services rendered."). Moreover, the trend seems to
be toward greater reluctance to hold compensation unreasonable. See 2 G.
WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 248, at 862.
250
See, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion,
263 A.D. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941).
247
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independence by giving the board the quasi-adversarial task of overseeing and
evaluating management. The model does pose additional problems regarding
the competence of directors, however, by giving them new tasks to perform.
At the same time, it increases the importance of competence because for the
first time directors will play a significant role in corporate governance.
Securing competent directors and ensuring their independence has been a
perennial problem. This Article will next consider the functioning of the
monitoring model with respect to the selection of competent, independent
directors and discuss whether courts can, under the duty of care, develop
enforceable rules to improve the process.
The problem of securing independent directors begins with the chief
executive officer's leverage over director retention and selection. 251 Although the monitoring model does not directly affect the selection of directors, it may reduce this leverage in several ways and thereby promote the
selection of more independent directors. The creation of a nominating committee composed primarily or, preferably, exclusively of outside directors
helps insulate the selection process from the chief executive officer, at least
if the chief is not a committee member. In the last few years many corporations have established such nominating committees. 252
Can a court require a corporation to have a certain percentage (perhaps a
majority) of outside, independent directors? Under the monitoring model,
one can cogently argue the affirmative. The model divests the board of the
duty to manage, a duty for which insiders are well suited, and instead
commands the board to monitor insiders, a task for which outsiders are not
only better suited but necessary if conflicts of interest are to be avoided. A
court could reasonably hold that the duty of the board is to monitor management; that the insiders, as members of management, cannot monitor
themselves; and, therefore, that the ordinary prudence demanded by the
duty of care requires the board to select and retain a majority of outside
directors.
At least for the next several years, however, no court is likely to adopt this
position. Until recently, a board with a majority of insiders was the rule, and
many boards are still dominated by a combination of inside and affiliated
directors. 253 Moreover, some studies have concluded that inside boards are
more effective than outside boards. 254 To demand a majority of independent
See M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 94-95: Solomon,supra note 3, at 605.
A survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries showed that of 993
responding companies the number with nominating committees grew between 1975
and 1978 from Ill to 297. American Society of Corporate Secretaries, The Overview
Committees of the Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1361 (1980). Of over
1,000 public companies recently surveyed by the SEC, 68.4% had compensation
committees. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,518, SEC Docket 1551, 1567
(Feb. 5, 1981).
25 3 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
2 5 4 S. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 5
25 1
25 2
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directors, then, will probably be too radical a change for the common law to
take.
Nonetheless, courts may well use the duty of care to require that oversight
committees, central to the monitoring model, 255 be created and staffed
entirely or predominantly by independent directors. Since oversight committees are a fairly new development, this would not be so radical a departure
from time-honored practices. A nominat'ing committee should have authority
to nominate directors for committee membership. New directors could then
be selected with a view to their ability to serve on specific committees. This
approach would ensure that important monitoring functions will be performed by independent committees without abandoning the ancient and
revered fiction that the board manages the corporation.
Requiring outsider-dominated oversight committees while permitting
insider-dominated boards would be a step forward but would not ensure
effective monitoring. The action of any board committee would probably be
subject to revision by the entire board. 256 Moreover, insiders who dominate
the entire board would be free to select and remove the committee members,
thereby ensuring favorable composition of these committees. The constant
threat of removal or nonreelection could compromise the independence of
outside directors and help preserve current boardroom etiquette, which
dictates that outsiders not rock the boat.
Because directors have traditionally done little of importance for the
corporation, 257 their competence has generally been unimportant. Although
(1964); Schmidt, Does Board Composition Really Make a Difference?, 12 CONF. Bn.
REc. 38 (Oct. 1975). But see H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 129-32, disputing Vance's
position and noting that virtually every study confirms the desirability of having
outside directors, and that shareholders and underwriters have insisted on outside
directors to protect against "myopia" and "the abuse of powers."
255
See notes 213-16 and accompanying text supra.
256
Several states expressly provide that the committee shall serve at the pleasure
of the board, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw§ 712(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980); OHIO REv.
ConE ANN.§ 1701.63(c) (Anderson 1978), or that a majority of the full board may
"(c) abolish any such committee at ;ts pleasure; and (d) remove any director from
membership on such committee at any time, with or without cause," N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:6-9(2) (West Supp. 1980), or that the committee shall be subject to the
direction and control of the board, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(4)(8) (West Supp.
1979). See also 7 F. WHITE, NEw YoRK CoRPORATION ~ 712.03 (13th ed. 1979). If
the statute does not grant and the full board does not expressly reserve such power,
whether the board may dissolve or overrule a committee is unclear. Several courts
have held, notwithstanding the literal language of the relevant statutes, that the board
is limited in the powers it can delegate to a committee. E.g., Hayes v. Canada, Atl. &
Plant S.S. Co., 181 F.289 (1st Cir. 1910); see Note, Executive CommitteesCreation, Procedures, and Authority, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42, 59-63. One commentator has suggested that because the committee is created by the board to assist in
management, •'there should be no question that the board may control the executive
committee." Id. at 47.
257
See notes 15-17, 23, & 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
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most outside directors are corporate executives 258 and no doubt competent
businessmen, the law has not often required directors to possess any
special skills. 259 The Corporate Directors' Guidebook, for example, refers to
such vague attributes as prudence and practical wisdom. 260 Monitoring may,
however, require particular skills for the effective functioning of the oversight committees. For example, evaluation of a given management's performance by an evaluation and compensation committee will require considerable sophistication. This will also be true for membership on an audit
committee, especially if that committee is to review accounting procedures
as well as guard against misuse of corporate funds. 261
Competence is a more nebulous quality than independence, but courts
might nevertheless impose some meaningful limits in this area. Although
courts have not traditionally required that directors possess any particular
skills, 262 they might indirectly impose such a requirement by holding that the
duty of care requires the board to nominate as new directors only persons
who possess some minimum skills. 263 Requirements would be easier to
impose if the director will be nominated for a committee that requires some
expertise. For example, a court could well hold that a reasonably prudent
person would not agree to sit on an audit committee, and that reasonably
prudent directors would not elect one of their number for an audit committee, unless the candidate had substantial acquaintance with auditing and
accounting procedures.
In addition to demanding competence and independence, monitoring also
requires outside directors to devote more time to their positions than they
traditionally have given. Few outsiders spend more than thirty-six hours per
year attending meetings; moreover, many receive little information about
the meeting prior to their attendance. 264 Although courts might not be able to
fix the amount of time that a director must devote tp his directorship, they
could increase the time actually devoted. The courts could insist that the
duty of care requires that the directors who perform the nominating function
258

See note 298 and accompanying text infra.
,
See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); 3A W. FLETCHER,
supra note 43, § 1061; MonEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 35, Comment at 257 (2d ed.
1977 Supp.); Stern, The General Standard of Care Imposed on Directors Under the
New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1269, 1276-77
(1976).
26
° Corporate Directors' Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1601.
261
See notes 273-75 and accompanying text infra.
262
See note 259 and accompanying text supra.
263
Such a requirement can hardly be deemed radical since directors are already
required to exercise due care in the selection and r~tention of officers. 3A W.
FLETCHER, supra note 43, §§ 1079-1080; H. HENN, supra note 45, § 211, at 342;
Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1607. Query whether there is an
adequate supply of competent outside directors. See note 169 and accompanying text
supra.
264
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 141-43; see note 26 supra.
259
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ascertain that nominees will be able to devote an adequate amount of time to
their positions and recommend that current directors not be renominated if
they do not devote sufficient time.
In sum, although a court cannot, under the duty of c~re, require the
selection of the most independent and competent board possible or the
commitment of specific amounts of time to directorships, it could impose
some meaningful demands in these areas.

C. Corporate Audits and Accounting Procedures
The most common oversight committee is the audit committee. 265 The
New York Stock Exchange requires listed companies to have audit committees composed solely of independent outside directors. 266 Until now audit committees have been intended primarily to prevent misuse of corporate
funds by management. A principal question is whether they can go beyond
this beneficial but limited function to the broader task of monitoring corporate accounting procedures.
Advocates of the audit committee conceived of it as a device to bring the
board and the independent auditor together, giving the board an independent
source of information about misuse of corporate funds and giving the auditor
an outlet for reports of management's misconduct. Although audit committees help to deter and discover some questionable payments, their effect is
probably limited. Accountants concede that an audit often cannot uncover
skillfully disguised misuse of funds. 267 Even when auditors do discover
questionable payments, they may be reluctant to report them to the audit
committee. Management may retaliate and make life difficult for the auditors
even if it cannot directly fire them. Also, auditors may fear that the board
will identify with and be more concerned about protecting management than
supporting the auditors. 268 An auditor might reasonably believe that the
risks of disclosure exceed the risks of nondisclosure. Furthermore, the
importance of deterring or discovering and punishing most questionable
payments is debatable. Some have argued that many questionable payments
are made in countries where such payments are standard practice and
therefore American law should not prohibit them; there is some sympathy
for restricting the scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 269
265
A survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries showed that in 1978,
963 of 993 responding companies had audit committees. American Society of Corporate Secretaries, supra note 252, at 1361.
266
See note 52 supra. In 1977, Connecticut enacted a law in effect requiring every
domestic corporation with 100 or more shareholders to have an audit committee.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-318(b)(l) (West Supp. 1980).
267
See DeMott, supra note 58, at 212-13; Harris, supra note 213, at 1239; Solomon, supra note 3, at 609.
268
Many factors compromise the independence and effectiveness ·of directors. See
notes 15-28 and accompanying text supra.
269
[1981] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Jan. 21, 1981) (President Reagan's
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Cour_ts could_construe th~ duty of care to req~ire a group with a majority
of outs1ders-e1ther the entrre board or a comm1ttee thereof-to work with
the firm's independent auditors to prevent misuse of corporate funds. Indeed, it seems likely that some court will so hold before long, considering that
the New York Stock Exchange has adopted a rule requiring an independent
audit committee and that even public companies not listed have widely
accepted it. However, the possibility of retaliation or board identification
with management will remain to some extent, and the difficulty of uncovering misuse of funds will also remain.
If audit committees are to play a significant role in corporate governance
they must venture beyond the limited task of deterring and discoverin~
questionable payments to the broader function of overseeing corporate
accounting practices. Financial statements are the heart of corporate disclosure, yet ·an intensifying debate questions the adequacy of the generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) used to compile those statements.270
Under GAAP, companies retain broad discretion in the accounting treatment of many important financial matters. 271 Traditionally, management has
selected corporate accounting procedures; but GAAP currently allows management to select procedures with a view to its own interests rather than to
candid disclosure. For example, managers often seek to maximize short-run
profits, 272 and toward that end they may try to accelerate the reporting of
income and defer the reporting of expenses, thereby distorting reports of the
corporation's financial performance.
However, an audit committee composed of outside directors would probably not choose accounting procedures materially different from those selected by management. Most audit committees will face severe constraints
of time and competence. Accounting is an extremely complex discipline; 273
monitoring a large public company's accounting practices will require much
time. The existing difficulty of finding competent directors with a willingness
to serve 274 and sufficient time to do so will become especially acute with
respect to an audit committee appointed to monitor accounting procedures. 275 Rules of most major accounting firms that bar both current and
transition team recommends amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to
remove its criminal penalties); G.A.O. Urges Easing of Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 5, 1981, § D, at 8, col. 5.
270
See H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 144-48; Benston, The Effectiveness and
Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in EcoNOMIC Poucv
AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 28-29 (H. Manne ed. 1969);
Speech by SEC Chairman Harold Williams, supra note 67, at 11, 14-15.
271
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 189-94, and authorities cited therein.
2 72 See note 231 supra.
273
Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1167-68 (1970).
274
See note 169 and accompanying text supra.
27 5 Membership on an audit committee will require a substantial amount of time. J.
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retired members from sitting on audit committees exacerbate the shortage.z76
Even if the audit committee has the time and competence to monitor
accounting practices, it will be subject to many of the same pressures which
influence management. Stock market prices tend to follow short-term performance277 and do not always reflect a sophisticated understanding of
complex accounting questions. 278 With the board playing an expanded role
in the corporation, the directors may very well identify their own success
with the corporation's success and be tempted to stress short-run performance in order to inflate the price of the corporation's stock. Moreover, if
the board selects accounting methods that do not magnify short-term profits,
it will have to face the unpleasant choice of either removing a management
team that is performing well or explaining to disgruntled shareholders that
the corporation's health is rosier than its financials suggest. The audit committee may well consider emphasis on short-term results preferable to either
of these alternatives. Failure to choose accounting methods that maximize
short-term profits and thus stock market price will also invite a tender offer
by a raider whose understanding of accounting may be more sophisticated
than the stock market's. The threat of a takeover, which if successful would
result in the loss of corporate positions for not only management but the
directors themselves, will pressure the audit committee to stress short-run
results.
BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE AUDIT CoMMITTEE 53-54
(1979).
.
276
Professional standards of the accounting profession prevent an accountant, and
perhaps even a retired accountant, from serving on the board of a corporation audited
by his firm or former firm. AICPA Code of Professional Ethics Rule of Conduct
IOJ(B)(1), 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 101.01; AICPA Interpretation of Rules of Conduct 101-2, 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH)
§ 101.03. Several of the AICPA's Concepts of Professional Ethics also suggest the
avoidance of conflict with other members of the profession. AICPA Concepts of
Professional Ethics, 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) §§ 55.01, .05-.06
(1979). To avoid such conflicts, an accounting firm might bar incumbent and even
retired members from serving on audit committees even if the firm is not the
corporation's auditor.
211
See note 231 supra.
278
Commentators have disagreed whether accounting changes that do not affect
cash flow affect stock price. Some believe that they do. Collins & Dent, The
Proposed Elimination of Full Cost Accounting in the Extractive Petroleitm Industry:
An Empirical Assessment of the Market Consequences, I J. AccouNTING & EcoN. 3
0979); Lev, The Impact of Accounting Regulation on the Stock Market: The
Case of Oil and Gas Companies, 54 AccouNTING REv. 485 (1979). But see
Dyckman & Smith, Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing
Companies: A Study of Information Effects, I J. AccoUNTING & EcoN. 48
0979); Ball, Changes in Accounting Techniques and Stock Prices, J. AccoUNTING
RESEARCH I (Supp. I_972, Empirical Research in Accoullting: Selected Studies).
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From the shareholder's perspective, this may not be undesirable. Although investors generally and the public at large may want accounting
procedures that most accurately portray corporate performance, existing
shareholders will often pr.efer financials.that exaggerate profits and thereby
boost current market pnce. Moreover, the board arguably owes its allegiance to the shareholders and thus ought to choose whatever permissible
accounting method will maximize the market price of the corporation's
stock.
In short, delegating the selection of accounting procedures to an audit
committee of outside directors rather than to management will probably not
substantially change the methods selected. ·Nor does it seem likely that a rule
of law can be fashioned that will require an audit committee to select specific
accounting procedures different from GAAP or from those management
would choose. Demanding superior accounting procedures will certainly
become possible as accounting theory develops, but this demand could as
easily be imposed on management as on an audit committee. Thus," the
monitoring model is not apt to produce significant improvements in the
accounting practices of major corporations.

D. Monitoring Compliance with the Law
Scandals over illegal corporate activities have led to suggestions that a
major board function should be monitoring compliance with the law. 279 Both
the evaluation of management performance and the audit committee discussed above are intended in part to monitor management's compliance with
the law, but neither is designed comprehensively to seek out and prevent
illegality. A legal compliance committee, similar to the audit committee but
with access to the company's inside and outside counsel, could be useful
because it would allow counsel to report management transgressions to
someone other than management.
Assigning the board a general duty to monitor compliance with the law,
however, poses several problems. Just as an audit committee may share the
same attitudes that cause management to make illegal bribes and political
contributions, 280 so outside directors may share the attitudes that cause
management to break other laws. If the board sympathizes with management, it will not relieve counsel's fear of retaliation for whistleblowing.
Moreover, counsel is likely to be even more ignorant of corporate illegality
than auditors are of misuse of funds.
To require the board continuously to investigate the firm's compliance
with the law would be unduly costly and impractical for a board dominated
21

~ See Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1610; The Role and
Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation:
Statemem of the Business Roundtable, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2101 (1978). See generally Coffee, supra note 101.
280 See note 268 and accompanying text supra.
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by outsiders. Ifthe board does act as a vigorous watchdog, management will
view the directors as spies and keep as much information from them as
possible. 281 Managements often break the law not to line their own pockets
but to increase profits, 282 and in such cases one might question whether the
board, as the elected representatives ofthe shareholders, should be assigned
the task of preventing such breaches.
Nonetheless, monitoring compliance with the law is a promising board
function. Although the board may sympathize with efforts to increase profits
by breaking laws, it will also be anxious to avoid p~rsonalliability for failure
to perform its duties. The board will therefore have an incentive to monitor
compliance with the law to the extent that the law requires it to do so. Even
if management attempts to keep the board ignorant of illegal activities, these
attempts will not always succeed and incentives can be devised to induce
management to keep the board well informed. 283 Although shareholders
might sometimes prefer that laws be broken in order to increase profits,
public policy need not give any weight to that preference.
E. Allocating Managerial Duties to Corporate Officers and the Officers'
Duty to Manage Carefully
The monitoring model of corporate governance demands a candid recognition that a public corporation can only be and therefore must be managed
by the corporate executives, not the board of directors. 284 As part of its
monitoring, however, the board should allocate management chores among
the corporate officers, or at least ensure that the chief executive officer has
made such an allocation. Even the advocates of monitoring, who recognize
the officers as the true managers of the corporation, have ignored the legal
duties and liabilities of the officers. Courts will find it difficult to fashion
concrete standards of care for many of the infinitely variable problems that
corporate officers face, but shifting managerial burdens does clear the way
for imposing on the officers a more rigorous duty to manage carefully. 285
Considering the almost complete ineffectiveness of the director's duty to
manage carefully under the traditional model of corporate governance,2 86
this would be a very significant change.

281
"[T]o get the outsiders poking around more than they are doing at present ...
is exactly what [inside managers] don't want." C. STONE, supra note 119, at 143. As
a result, the board "was always the last group to hear of trouble in great business
catastrophes of the century." P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 628 (1973).
282
See Werner, supra note 49, particularly at 388-89.
283
See Coffee, supra note 101, at 1147-56 (advocating a ''mini-board" structure
and other devices for improving the flow of information to the board)
284
See notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.
285
See notes 199-205 and accompanying text supra
286
See notes 131-64 and accompanying text supra
0
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F. Reviewing Interested Transactions

(

,.''

Most state corporation laws provide that noninterested members of th
board may review a transaction in which any corporate officer or director .e
1
financially interested. 287 This board review constitutes a long-establishe ~
form of monitoring. The growing significance of arguably interested transactions in anti-takeover efforts and board termination of derivative suits h
increased the importance of the law of interested transactions.2ss To dat~s
the interested director's in:fluence over the noninterested directors ha~
rendered board review ineffective to protect the corporation from unfair
transactions. The monitoring model increases board independence2B9 and
thus may improve review of interested transactions, but the improvement
will probably be slight, especially if inside and affiliated directors remain a
board majority. 290 Directors will still tend to favor the insiders. The value
of board review perhaps could be enhanced by increasing the liabilities of
noninterested directors who approve unfair transactions. However, courts
are unlikely to impose such liability except in the rare case in which bad faith
can be shown; 291 moreover, the threat of liability could be counterproductive if the board were made so cautious that it refused to approve even
beneficial transactions. A standard that required proof of the reviewing
directors' bad faith would probably lead not to more effective board review
but to the ritual building of a large, essentially meaningless, paper record
designed to show the board's diligence and good faith. 292
More important than the standard of the directors' liability for approving
interested transactions is the question of the effect of that approval on a
subsequent shareholders' derivative suit seeking to set aside the transaction or to hold the interested persons liable for damages. State law is
unclear on this point: some statutes and cases suggest that noninterested
director approval constitutes a complete defense to such a suit; others
suggest that it does not prevent a court from deciding whether the transaction was fair to the corporation. 293 If board review became a substantial
187
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 713 (McKinney Supp. 1980); MoDEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 41 (1976). See generally

W, CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 604-06.
288
SeeM. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 294 (1978);
Dent, supra note 138; Leech & Mundheim, supra no.te 20, at 1819-21.
289
See note 47-48 & 251-52 and accompanying text supra.
zyo See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
ZYI See notes 130-41 and accompanying text supra.
zn Conard, supra note 42, at 903-04.
293
See statutes cited in note 287 supra. Compare id. with Scott v. Multi-Amp
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1974) and Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement
Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 170, 260 P.2d 823, 831-32 (1953) and Remillard Brick Co.
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952) and
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (all holding that an interested
transaction must be reviewed for fairness, even though the statutory language read
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barrier to shareholders challenging interested transactions, its overall effect
on corporate law would be pernicious indeed. But if it did not create such
a barrier, independent director review may be beneficial. The prospect of
board review, especially if the board is substantially independent, may be a
better inducement to insiders to design their transactions with the corporation more fairly than the threat of a derivative suit which may never be
filed and which, if filed, will face numerous procedural obstacles. 294

G. The Monitoring Board and Social Goals
In the 1930's, Professors Berle and Dodd began what has become an
ongoing debate over the extent to which corporate decisionmakers should
weigh the social impact of their actions. 295 Some have argued that a
social conscience can and must be instilled in the corporation by changes
in corporate governance; 296 others contend that the corporation's social
responsibility is solely to maximize its profits. 297 This Article will not
attempt to resolve this debate, but it is appropriate to consider the effect of
monitoring on the corporate social conscience. The monitoring model is apt
to produce a board committed to financial rather than social goals. By
tradition, most outside directors are businessmen 298 who generally share the
profit orientation of management. It is hard to imagine that any board
literally suggested that approval by a majority of disinterested directors or shareholders is sufficient by itself). See generally H. HENN, supra note 45, § 239, at 375-76;
N. LATTIN, supra note 131, at 290-94; Israels, The Corporate Triangle-Some
Aspects of the New Jersey, New York and Delaware Statutes, 23 RuTGERS L. REV.
615, 627-28 (1969); Note, "Interested Director's " Contracts-Section 713 of the
New York Business Corporation Lall' and the "Fairness" Test, 41 FoRDHAM L. REV.
639, 648 (1973) and authorities cited therein; Note, The "Unfair" Interested Directors' Contract Under the Ne11' York Business Corporation Lcn1', 16 BUFFALO L. REV.
840, 841-43 (1967) and authorities cited therein.
2 4
~ See note 164 supra.
295
The debate began with Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932), and the response in Eerie, For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). For a continuation of
the debate see Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (i979); Weiner, The Eerie-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964 ).
2
% See R. NADER, supra note 3; Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in
CORPORATE PoWER IN AMERICA 67 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973).
297
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33, reprinted in M. FRIEDMAN, AN
EcoNOMIST's PROTEST 177-84 (1972). Professor Kripke has recently discussed the
dangers of a board dominated by outsiders and committed to social rather than
financial goals. See Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Go1•ernance, and the Real Issues,
3 Bus. LAw. 173 (1981). The author tends to agree with Professor Kripke's analy-
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would deliberately depart from this tradition or that new directors not
sharing the profit orientation would be nominated in large numbers by
accident. Moreover, even if a board wanted substantially to abandon profit
maximization, it probably could not do so for long because such action
would attract takeover bids, proxy fights, and derivative suits for corporate
waste. 299 If successful, any of the above would quickly reorient the corporation toward profit maximization.
H.

Other Monitoring Functions

Other monitoring functions will probably not be as important as those
previously discussed. The board will continue to be an occasional source
of advice and counsel to management, but this will remain an insignificant
function. 300 The board will still be required by state corporation laws to
approve certain transactions, such as mergers and declarations of dividends.301 Perhaps the more independent board envisioned by the monitoring
model will play a more active role in such situations than the traditional
board has, but for the most part the board will continue to rubber stamp
management's proposals. Indeed, this is consistent with the philosophy that
the board's function is to monitor, not to manage.
VII.
A.

CODA

The Duty of Care vs. Other Possible Ei1forcement Mechanisms: A
Recapitulation

This Article earlier concluded that the duty of care could be at least as
effective a tool for enforcing the monitoring model as any new or existing
legislation. 3° 2 In light of the subsequent conclusion that the duty of care is a
deeply flawed tool for this purpose, it is appropriate briefly to reconsider the
earlier conclusion. New legislation could overcome some problems noted
with respect to the duty of care. For example, new legislation could require a
majority of outside directors and even define the. size of the required majority. However, most problems, especially the problem of providing sub29, 39 (1973): M. MACE, supra note 13, at 87, 96-97,
106; Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
217 (1971); Soderquist, supra note 146, at 1350-51; Solomon, supra note 3, at 584 &
n.13.
<~~ A!~pq\lgh none of these devices is completely effective, see notes 71-81 & 164
and accompanying text supra; see generally notes 130-64 and accompanying text
supra, they do in ·many cases constitute a substantial constraint on the ability of the
~oard to abandon the goal of profit maximization. See Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, J. PoL. EcoN. 73 (1965); note 163 sujJra.
3° 0 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 157-58.
3° 1 See note 145 supra.
3° 2 See text accompanying notes 123-24 and text preceding note 165 supra.
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stantive standards for the board's duty to evaluate management's performance, are inherent in monitoring and are thus not subject to legislative
solution. In light of the tremendous political obstacles to new legislation,
efforts to require adoption of the monitoring model and to enforce duties
thereunder will be better focused on the duty of care despite its shortcomings. It follows a fortiori that existing legislation, none of which was designed to enforce the monitoring model, is also less promising than the duty
of care.

B. Conclusion
The common law duty of care can, with minor exceptions, accomplish as
much as new or existing legislation toward mandating and enforcing the
monitoring model of corporate governance and is preferable thereto because of the political improbability of enacting effective legislation. Most of
the considerations that have led the courts to eviscerate the duty of care
disappear under the monitoring model. The time is propitious for persuading the courts to reinvigorate the duty of care-the American Law Institute
(ALI) has undertaken a project on corporate governance 303 and, if it
adopts an approach to the duty of care similar to that proposed in this
Article, the prestige of the ALI will induce many courts to follow suit just as
they have in the past followed the ALI's Restatements of the Law.
A far greater problem than convincing the courts to breathe life into the
duty of care will be articulating specific, enforceable substantive standards
for the discrete functions to be performed by the board under the monitoring model. Although the courts can impose effective substantive standards
in some cases and at least require boards to follow certain procedures in
others, they will usually find it impossible to articulate substantive standards. Thus, the monitoring model will be a largely unenforceable ideal,
and will probably be so even if legislation is enacted to enforce it.
This does not mean that the monitoring model is useless. The combined
weight of the law's moral force, of court-imposed procedural requirements,
and of outside directors' good faith will lead to some effective monitoring.
Certainly, the impact on corporate governance should be more beneficial
than abolition of the board of directors, the only alternative if one rejects
monitoring: if the board cannot monitor, there is no useful function it can
P~rform. But there should be no unrealistic expectations about the magmtude of the benefit. Long traditions of directorial passivity must be
overcome if boards are to monitor effectively, and neither market forces
nor the law are adequate to the purpose.
R
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